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Abstract This paper presents a formal specification
of the Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV)
routing protocol using AWN (Algebra for Wireless Net-
works), a recent process algebra which has been tailored
for the modelling of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks and Wire-
less Mesh Network protocols. Our formalisation models
the exact details of the core functionality of AODV,
such as route discovery, route maintenance and error
handling. We demonstrate how AWN can be used to
reason about critical protocol properties by providing
detailed proofs of loop freedom and route correctness.
Keywords Wireless mesh networks; mobile ad-hoc
networks; routing protocols; AODV; process algebra;
AWN; loop freedom.
1 Introduction
Routing protocols are crucial to the dissemination of
data packets between nodes in Wireless Mesh Networks
(WMNs) and Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs).
One of the most popular protocols that is widely used
in WMNs is the Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vec-
tor (AODV) routing protocol [39]. It is one of the four
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protocols standardised by the IETF MANET working
group, and it also forms the basis of new WMN routing
protocols, including the Hybrid Wireless Mesh Proto-
col (HWMP) in the IEEE 802.11s wireless mesh net-
work standard [27]. The details of the AODV protocol
are standardised in IETF RFC 3561 [39]. However, due
to the use of English prose, this specification contains
ambiguities and contradictions. This can lead to signif-
icantly different implementations of the AODV routing
protocol, depending on the developer’s understanding
and reading of the AODV RFC. In the worst case sce-
nario, an AODV implementation may contain serious
flaws, such as routing loops [20].
Traditional approaches to the analysis of AODV
and many other AODV-based protocols [41,27,46,50,
43] are simulation and test-bed experiments. While such
methods are important and valid for protocol evalua-
tion, in particular for quantitative performance evalua-
tion, they have limitations in regards to the evaluation
of basic protocol correctness properties. Experimental
evaluation is resource intensive and time consuming,
and, even after a very long time of evaluation, only a
finite set of network scenarios can be considered—no
general guarantee can be given about correct protocol
behaviour for a wide range of unpredictable deployment
scenarios [2]. This problem is illustrated by recent dis-
coveries of limitations in AODV-like protocols that have
been under intense scrutiny over many years [35].
We believe that formal methods can help in this re-
gard; they complement simulation and test-bed experi-
ments as methods for protocol evaluation and verifica-
tion, and provide stronger and more general assurances
about protocol properties and behaviour. The overall
goal is to reduce the “time-to-market” for better (new
or modified) WMN protocols, and to increase the relia-
bility and performance of the corresponding networks.
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In this paper we provide a complete and accurate
formal specification of the core functionality of AODV
using the specification language AWN (Algebra of Wire-
less Networks) [15]. AWN provides the right level of
abstraction to model key features such as unicast and
broadcast, while abstracting from implementation-rela-
ted details. As its semantics is completely unambiguous,
specifying a protocol in such a framework enforces to-
tal precision and the removal of any ambiguities. A key
contribution is to demonstrate how AWN can be used
to support reasoning about protocol behaviour and to
provide rigorous proofs of key protocol properties, us-
ing the examples of loop freedom and route correctness.
In contrast to what can be achieved by model checking
and test-bed experiments, our proofs apply to all con-
ceivable dynamic network topologies.
Route correctness is a minimal sanity requirement
for a routing protocol; it is the property that the rout-
ing table entries stored at a node are entirely based
on information on routes to other nodes that either is
currently valid or was valid at some point in the past.
Loop freedom is a critical property for any routing pro-
tocol, but it is particularly relevant and challenging for
WMNs. Descriptions as in [17] capture the common un-
derstanding of loop freedom: “A routing-table loop is a
path specified in the nodes’ routing tables at a particu-
lar point in time that visits the same node more than
once before reaching the intended destination.” Packets
caught in a routing loop, until they are discarded by the
IP Time-To-Live (TTL) mechanism, can quickly satu-
rate the links and have a detrimental impact on network
performance. It is therefore critical to ensure that pro-
tocols prevent routing loops. We show that loop free-
dom can be guaranteed only if sequence numbers are
used in a careful way, considering further rules and as-
sumptions on the behaviour of the protocol. The prob-
lem is, as shown in the case of AODV, that these addi-
tional rules and assumptions are not explicitly stated in
the RFC, and that the RFC has significant ambiguities
in regards to this. To the best of our knowledge we are
the first to give a complete and detailed proof of loop
freedom.1 2
The rigorous protocol analysis discussed in this pa-
per has the potential to save a significant amount of
1 Loop freedom of AODV has been “proven” at least
thrice [42,3,55], but the proofs in [42] and [3] are not cor-
rect, and the one in [55] is based on a simple subset of AODV
only, not including the “intermediate route reply” feature—a
most likely source of loops. We elaborate on this in Section 7.
2 In this paper, we abstract from timing issues by postulat-
ing that routing table entries never expire. Consequently, we
can make no claim on routing loops resulting from premature
expiration of routing tables entries. This will be the subject
of a forthcoming paper [8].
time in the development and evaluation of new network
protocols, can provide increased levels of assurance of
protocol correctness, and complements simulation and
other experimental protocol evaluation approaches.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.
Section 2 gives an informal introduction to AODV. We
briefly recapitulate AWN in Section 3. Section 5 pro-
vides a detailed formal specification of AODV in AWN.3
To achieve this, we present the basic data structure
needed in Section 4. In Section 6 we formally prove
some properties of AODV that can be expressed as in-
variants, in particular loop freedom and route correct-
ness.4 Section 7 describes related work, and in Section 8
we summarise our findings and point at work that is yet
to be done.
2 The AODV Routing Protocol
The Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) rout-
ing protocol [39] is a widely-used routing protocol de-
signed for MANETs, and is one of the four protocols
currently standardised by the IETF MANET working
group5. It also forms the basis of new WMN routing
protocols, including the Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol
(HWMP) in the IEEE 802.11s wireless mesh network
standard [27].
AODV is a reactive protocol: routes are established
only on demand. A route from a source node s to a des-
tination node d is a sequence of nodes [s, n1, . . . , nk, d],
where n1, . . . , nk are intermediate nodes located on
the path from s to d. Its basic operation can best be
explained using a simple example topology shown in
Figure 1(a), where edges connect nodes within trans-
mission range. We assume node s wants to send a data
packet to node d, but s does not have a valid rout-
ing table entry for d. Node s initiates a route discovery
mechanism by broadcasting a route request (RREQ)
message, which is received by s’s immediate neighbours
a and b. We assume that neither a nor b knows a route
to the destination node d.6 Therefore, they simply re-
broadcast the message, as shown in Figure 1(b). Each
RREQ message has a unique identifier which allows
nodes to ignore duplicate RREQ messages that they
have handled before.
3 Parts of the specification have been published before in
“A Process Algebra for Wireless Mesh Networks” [15], in
“Automated Analysis of AODV using UPPAAL” [14] and in
“A Rigorous Analysis of AODV and its Variants” [26].
4 A sketch of the loop freedom proof is given in [15] and
in [26].
5 http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/manet/charter/
6 In case an intermediate node knows a route to d, it di-
rectly sends a route reply back.
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Fig. 1 Example network topology
When forwarding the RREQ message, each inter-
mediate node updates its routing table and adds a “re-
verse route” entry to s, indicating via which next hop
the node s can be reached, and the distance in number
of hops. Once the first RREQ message is received by
the destination node d (we assume via a), d also adds
a reverse route entry in its routing table, saying that
node s can be reached via node a, at a distance of 2
hops.
Node d then responds by generating a route reply
(RREP) message and sending it back to node s, as
shown in Figure 1(c). In contrast to the RREQ mes-
sage, the RREP is unicast, i.e., it is sent to an individ-
ual next hop node only. The RREP is sent from d to
a, and then to s, using the reverse routing table entries
created during the forwarding of the RREQ message.
When processing the RREP message, a node creates a
“forward route” entry into its routing table. For exam-
ple, upon receiving the RREP via a, node s creates an
entry saying that d can be reached via a, at a distance
of 2 hops. At the completion of the route discovery pro-
cess, a route has been established from s to d, and data
packets can start to flow.
In the event of link and route breaks, AODV uses
route error (RERR) messages to inform affected nodes.
Sequence numbers, another important aspect of
AODV, indicate the freshness of routing information.
AODV “uses destination sequence numbers to ensure
loop freedom at all times (even in the face of anomalous
delivery of routing control messages), ...” [39]. A proof
of loop freedom of AODV has been sketched in [42].
Nodes maintain their own sequence number as well as
a destination sequence number for each route discov-
ered. This use of sequence numbers can be an efficient
approach to address the problem of routing loops, but
has to be taken with caution, since loop freedom cannot
be guaranteed a priori [20].
3 The Specification Language AWN
Ideally, any specification is free of ambiguities and con-
tradictions. Using English prose only, this is nearly im-
possible to achieve. Hence every specification should
be equipped with a formal specification. The choice
of an appropriate specification language is often sec-
ondary, although it has high impact on the analysis.
The use of any formal specification language helps to
avoid ambiguities and to precisely describe the intended
behaviour. Examples of modelling languages are (i) the
Alloy language, used by Zave to model Chord [54]; (ii)
timed automata, which are the input language for the
Uppaal model checker and used by Chiyangwa, Kwiat-
kowska [9] and others [14] to reason about AODV; (iii)
routing algebra as introduced by Griffin and Sobrinho
[23], or (iv) AWN, a process algebra particularly tai-
lored for (wireless mesh) routing protocols [15,26].
For this paper we choose the modelling language
AWN: on the one hand it is tailored for wireless proto-
cols and therefore offers primitives such as broadcast;
on the other hand, it defines the protocol in a pseudo-
code that is easily readable. (The language itself is im-
plementation independent). AWN is a variant of stan-
dard process algebras [34,25,1,4], extended with a local
broadcast mechanism and a novel conditional unicast
operator—allowing error handling in response to failed
communications while abstracting from link layer im-
plementations of the communication handling—and in-
corporating data structures with assignments. It also
describes the interaction between nodes in a network
with a dynamic network topology. Process algebras such
as AWN are equipped with an operational semantics
[15,16]: once a model has been described, its behaviour
is governed by the transitions allowed by the algebra’s
semantics. This can significantly reduce the burden of
proofs. In this paper we abstain from a formal definition
of the operational semantics.7 Instead, we employ a cor-
respondence between the transitions of AWN processes
and the execution of actions—subexpressions as occur
in Entries 3–10 of Table 1—identified by line numbers
in protocol specifications in AWN.
7 Thereby we also abstain from explaining the modelling
of the dynamic network topology in the semantics, i.e., the
mechanism by which links between nodes break. This matter
is explained in [15,16], and completely orthogonal to the for-
mal specification of the AODV protocol and the correctness
properties that are the focus of this paper. In particular, the
correctness properties hold independently of the number of
link breaks or link occurrences.
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Table 1 process expressions
X(exp
1
, . . . , exp
n
) process name with arguments
p+ q choice between proc. p and q
[ϕ]p conditional process
[[var := exp]]p assignment followed by process p
broadcast(ms).p broadcast ms followed by p
groupcast(dests ,ms).p iterative unicast or multicast to
all destinations dests
unicast(dest ,ms).p ◮ q unicast ms to dest; if successful
proceed with p; otherwise with q
send(ms).p synchronously transmit ms to
parallel process on same node
deliver(data).p deliver data to application layer
receive(msg).p receive a message
ξ, p process with valuation
P 〈〈Q parallel procs. on the same node
a :P :R node a running P with range R
N‖M parallel composition of nodes
[N ] encapsulation
We use an underlying data structure (described in
detail in Section 4) with several types, variables ranging
over these types, operators and predicates. First order
predicate logic yields terms (or data expressions) and
formulas to denote data values and statements about
them. The AWN data structure always contains the
types DATA, MSG, IP and P(IP) of application layer
data, messages, IP addresses—or any other node iden-
tifiers—and sets of IP addresses. The messages com-
prise data packets, containing application layer data,
and control messages. The rest of the data structure is
customisable for any application of AWN.
In AWN, a WMN is modelled as an encapsulated
parallel composition of network nodes. On each node
several processes may be running in parallel. Network
nodes communicate with their direct neighbours—those
nodes that are currently in transmission range—using
either broadcast, unicast, or an iterative unicast/multi-
cast (here called groupcast). The process expressions are
given in Table 1. A process name X comes with a defin-
ing equation
X(var1, . . . , varn)
def
= p ,
where p is a process expression, and the vari are data
variables maintained by process X . A named process
is like a procedure; when it is called, data expressions
expi of the appropriate type are filled in for the vari-
ables vari. Furthermore, ϕ is a condition, var := exp an
assignment of a data expression exp to a variable var
of the same type, dest, dests, data and ms data expres-
sions of types IP, P(IP), DATA and MSG, respectively,
and msg a data variable of type MSG.
Given a valuation of the data variables by concrete
data values, the process [ϕ]p acts as p if ϕ evaluates to
true, and deadlocks if ϕ evaluates to false.8 In case
ϕ contains free variables that are not yet interpreted
as data values, values are assigned to these variables
in any way that satisfies ϕ, if possible. The process
[[var := exp]]p acts as p, but under an updated valu-
ation of the data variables. The process p+ q may act
either as p or as q, depending on which of the two is able
to act at all. In a context where both are able to act,
it is not specified how the choice is made. The process
broadcast(ms).p broadcasts (the data value bound to
the expression) ms to the other network nodes within
range, and subsequently acts as p, whereas the process
unicast(dest ,ms).p ◮ q tries to unicast the message
ms to the destination dest; if successful it continues to
act as p and otherwise as q.9 The latter models an ab-
straction of an acknowledgment-of-receipt mechanism
that is typical for unicast communication but absent in
broadcast communication, as implemented by the link
layer of wireless standards such as IEEE 802.11. The
process groupcast(dests ,ms).p tries to transmit ms
to all destinations dests, and proceeds as p regardless
of whether any of the transmissions is successful. The
process send(ms).p synchronously transmits a message
to another process running on the same network node;
this action can occur only when the other process is
able to receive the message. The process receive(msg).p
receives any message m (a data value of type MSG) ei-
ther from another node, from another process running
on the same node or from the application layer pro-
cess on the local node. It then proceeds as p, but with
the data variable msg bound to the value m. In partic-
ular, receive(newpkt(data , dip)) models the injection
of a data from the application layer, where the func-
tion newpkt generates a message containing the appli-
cation layer data and the intended destination address
dip. Data is delivered to the application layer by de-
liver(data).
A (state of a) valuated process P is given as a pair
(ξ, p) of an expression p built from the above syntax,
together with a (partial) valuation function ξ that spec-
ifies values of the data variables maintained by p. Fi-
nally, P 〈〈Q denotes a parallel composition of processes
P and Q, with information piped from right to left; in
our application Q will be a message queue.
In the full process algebra [15], node expressions
a :P :R are given by process expressions P , annotated
with an address a and a set of nodes R that are within
8 As operators we also allow partial functions with the con-
vention that any atomic formula containing an undefined sub-
term evaluates to false.
9 The unicast is unsuccessful if the destination dest is out
of transmission range of the node ip performing the unicast,
i.e., if in the dynamic network topology there is currently no
link between ip and dest.
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transmission range of a. A partial network is then mod-
elled as a parallel composition of node expressions, us-
ing the operator ‖, and a complete network is obtained
by placing this composition in the scope of an encapsu-
lation operator [ ]. The main purpose of the encapsula-
tion operator is to prevent the receipt of messages that
have never been sent by other nodes in the network—
with the exception of messages newpkt(data,dip) stem-
ming from the application layer of a node. More details
on the language AWN can be found in [16].
To illustrate the use of AWN we consider a network
of two nodes on which the same process is running. One
node broadcasts an integer value. A received broadcast
message will be delivered to the application layer if its
value is 1. Otherwise the node decrements its value and
broadcasts the new value. The behaviour of each node
can be modelled by:
X(n)
def
= broadcast(n).Y()
Y()
def
= receive(m).([m=1] deliver(m).Y() .
+ [m 6=1] X(m−1))
If a node is in a state X(n) it will broadcast n and con-
tinue in state Y(). If a node is in state Y(), and it re-
ceives m, it has two ways to continue. Process [m=1]
deliver(m).Y() is enabled if m=1. In that case m will
be delivered to the application layer, and the process
returns to Y(). Alternatively, if m 6=1, the process con-
tinues as X(m−1). Note that calls to processes use ex-
pressions as parameters, in this case m−1.
Let us have a look at two network topologies. First,
assume that the nodes a and b are within transmis-
sion range of each other; node a in state X(2), and
node b in Y(). In AWN this is formally expressed as
[a:X(2):{b} ‖ b:Y():{a}], although below we simply write
X(2) ‖ Y(). Then, node a broadcasts 2 and continues as
Y(). Node b receives 2, and continues as X(1). Next b
broadcasts 1, and continues as Y(), while node a receives
1, and, since the condition m=1 is satisfied, delivers 1
and continues as Y(). This gives rise to transitions from
one state to the other:
X(2) ‖ Y() a:broadcast(2)−−−−−−−−−−→ Y() ‖ X(1) b:broadcast(1)−−−−−−−−−→
a:deliver(1)−−−−−−−→ Y() ‖ Y() .
In state Y() ‖ Y() no further activity is possible; the net-
work has reached a deadlock.
Second, assume that the nodes are not within trans-
mission range; formally [a:X(2) : ∅ ‖ b:Y() : ∅]. Again a is
in state X(2), and b in Y(). As before, node a broadcasts
2 and continues as Y(); but this time the message is not
received by any node; hence no message is forwarded or
delivered and both nodes end up in state Y().
For the last scenario, we assume that a and b are
within transmission range and that both nodes have
the same initial state X(1). Assuming that no packet
collisions occur, and node a sends first:
X(1) ‖ X(1) a:broadcast(1)−−−−−−−−−−→ Y() ‖ X(1) b:broadcast(1)−−−−−−−−−→
a:deliver(1)−−−−−−−→ Y() ‖ Y() .
Unfortunately, node b is in a state where it cannot
receive a message, so a’s message “remains unheard”
and b will never deliver that message. To avoid this be-
haviour, and ensure that both messages get delivered,
as happens in real WMNs, a message queue can be in-
troduced (see Section 5.6).
4 Data Structure for AODV
In this section we present the data structure needed
for the detailed formal specification of AODV. As well
as describing types for the information handled at the
nodes during the execution of the protocol we also de-
fine functions which will be used to describe the pre-
cise intention—and overall effect—of the various update
mechanisms in an AODV implementation. The defini-
tions are grouped roughly according to the various “as-
pects” of AODV and the host network.
Many of the presented type and function definitions
are straightforward; so in principle this section can be
skipped or be used as reference material.
4.1 Mandatory Types
As stated in the previous section, the data structure
always consists of application layer data, messages, IP
addresses and sets of IP addresses.
(a) The ultimate purpose of AODV is to deliver ap-
plication layer data. The type DATA describes a set
of application layer data items. An item of data is
thus a particular element of that set, denoted by
the variable data ∈ DATA.
(b) Messages are used to send information via the net-
work. In our specification we use the variable msg of
the type MSG. We distinguish AODV control mes-
sages (route request, route reply, and route error)
as well as data packets : messages for sending appli-
cation layer data (see Section 4.8).
(c) The type IP describes a set of IP addresses or,
more generally, a set of node identifiers. In the RFC
3561 [39], IP is defined as the set of all IP addresses.
We assume that each node has a unique identifier
ip ∈ IP. Moreover, in our model, each node ip main-
tains a variable ip which always has the value ip. In
any AODV control message, the variable sip holds
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the IP address of the sender, and if the message
is part of the route discovery process—a route re-
quest or route reply message—we use oip and dip
for the origin and destination of the route sought.
Furthermore, rip denotes an unreachable destina-
tion (a destination to which a route was established
earlier, but this route is now broken) and nhip the
next hop on some route.
4.2 Sequence Numbers
As explained in Section 2, any node maintains its own
sequence number—the value of the variable sn—and
a routing table whose entries describe routes to other
nodes. The value of sn increases over time. In AODV
each routing table entry is equipped with a sequence
number to constitute a measure approximating the rel-
ative freshness of the information held—a smaller num-
ber denotes older information. All sequence numbers of
routes to dip ∈ IP stored in routing tables are ulti-
mately derived from dip’s own sequence number at the
time such a route was discovered.
We denote the set of sequence numbers by SQN and
assume it to be totally ordered. By default we take SQN
to be IN, and use standard functions such as max. The
initial sequence number of any node is 1. We reserve
a special element 0 ∈ SQN to be used for the sequence
number of a route, whose semantics is that no sequence
number for that route is known. Sequence numbers are
incremented by the function
inc : SQN → SQN
inc(sn) =
{
sn+ 1 if sn 6= 0
sn otherwise .
The variables osn, dsn and rsn of type SQN are used to
denote the sequence numbers of routes leading to the
nodes oip, dip and rip.
AODV tags sequence numbers of routes as “known”
or “unknown”. This indicates whether the value of the
sequence number can be trusted. The sequence-number-
status flag is set to unknown (unk) when a routing table
entry is updated with information that is not equipped
with a sequence number itself. In such a case the old
sequence number of the entry is maintained; hence the
value unk does not indicate that no sequence number for
the entry is known. Here we use the set K = {kno, unk}
for the possible values of the sequence-number-status
flag; we use the variable dsk to range over type K.
4.3 Modelling Routes
In a network, pairs (ip0, ipk) ∈ IP×IP of nodes are con-
sidered to be “connected” if ip0 can send to ipk directly,
i.e., ip0 is in transmission range of ipk and vice versa.
We say that such nodes are connected by a single hop.
When ip0 is not connected to ipk then messages from
ip0 directed to ipk need to be “routed” through inter-
mediate nodes. We say that a route (from ip0 to ipk)
is made up of a sequence [ip0, ip1, ip2, . . . , ipk−1, ipk],
where (ipi, ipi+1), i = 0, . . . , k−1, are connected pairs;
the length or hop count of the route is the number of
single hops, and any node ipi needs only to know the
“next hop” address ipi+1 in order to be able to route
messages intended for the final destination ipk.
In operation, information about routes to certain
destinations is stored in routing tables maintained at
each node. This information sometimes needs to be re-
evaluated in regard to its validity. Routes may become
invalid if one of the pairs (ipi, ipi+1) in the hop-to-hop
sequence gets disconnected. Then AODV may be rein-
voked, as the need arises, to discover alternative routes.
In addition to the next hop and hop count, AODV
also “tags” a route with its validity, sequence number
and sequence-number status. Information about invalid
routes is preserved until fresh information is received
that establishes a valid replacement route. The pur-
pose of this is to compare the sequence number and
hop count of the replacement route with that of the
invalid one, to check that the information is indeed
fresher (or equally fresh while the replacement route
is shorter). For every route, a node moreover stores a
list of precursors, modelled as a set of IP addresses.
This set collects all nodes which are currently poten-
tial users of the route, and are located one hop further
“upstream”. When the interest of other nodes emerges,
these nodes are added to the precursor list;10 the main
purpose of recording this information is to inform those
nodes when the route becomes invalid.
In summary, following the RFC, a routing table en-
try (or entry for short) is given by 7 components:
(a) The destination IP address—an element of IP;
(b) The destination sequence number—an element of
SQN;
(c) The sequence-number-status flag—an element of
the set K = {kno, unk};
(d) A flag tagging the route as being valid or invalid—
an element of the set F = {val, inv}. We use the
variable flag to range over type F;
(e) The hop count, which is an element of IN. The vari-
able hops ranges over the type IN and we make use
of the standard function +1;
(f) The next hop, which is again an element of IP; and
10 The RFC does not mention a situation where nodes are
dropped from the list, which seems curious.
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(g) A precursor list, which is modelled as an element
of P(IP).11 The variable pre ranges over P(IP).
We denote the type of routing table entries by R, and
use the variable r. A tuple
(dip ,dsn ,dsk ,flag ,hops ,nhip ,pre)
describes a route to dip of length hops and validity flag;
the very next node on this route is nhip; the last time
the entry was updated the destination sequence num-
ber was dsn; dsk denotes whether the sequence number
is “outdated” or can be used to reason about fresh-
ness of the route. Finally, pre is a set of all neighbours
who are “interested” in the route to dip. A node being
“interested” in the route is somewhat sketchily defined
as one which has previously used the current node to
route messages to dip. Interested nodes are recorded in
case the route to dip should ever become invalid, so that
they may subsequently be informed. We use projections
π1, . . . π7 to select the corresponding component from
the 7-tuple: For example, π6 : R → IP determines the
next hop.
4.4 Routing Tables
Nodes store all their information about routes in their
routing tables ; a node ip’s routing table consists of a
set of routing table entries, exactly one for each known
destination. Thus, a routing table is defined as a set
of entries, with the restriction that each has a different
destination dip, i.e., the first component of each entry
in a routing table is unique.12 Formally, we define the
type RT of routing tables by
RT := {rt ∈P(R) | ∀r, s ∈ rt : r 6= s⇒ π1(r) 6= π1(s)} .
AODV chooses between alternative routes if necessary
to ensure that only one route per destination ends up
in a given node’s routing table. In our model, each node
ip maintains a variable rt, whose value is the current
routing table of the node.
In the formal model (and indeed in any AODV im-
plementation) we need to extract the components of the
entry for any given destination from a routing table. To
this end, we define the following partial functions—they
are partial because the routing table need not have an
entry for the given destination. We begin by selecting
11 The word “precursor list” is used in the RFC, but no
properties of lists are used.
12 As an alternative to restricting the set, we could have
defined routing tables as partial functions from IP to R, in
which case it makes more sense to define an entry as a 6-tuple,
not including the the destination IP as the first component.
the entry in a routing table corresponding to a given
destination dip:
σroute : RT× IP⇀ R
σroute(rt ,dip) :=
{
r if r ∈ rt ∧ π1(r) = dip
undefined otherwise .
Through the projections π1, . . . , π7, defined above, we
can now select the components of a selected entry:
(a) The destination sequence number relative to dip:
sqn : RT× IP→ SQN
sqn(rt ,dip) :=


π2(σroute(rt ,dip))
if σroute(rt ,dip) is defined
0 otherwise .
(b) The “known” status of a route’s sequence number:
sqnf : RT× IP→ K
sqnf(rt ,dip) :=


π3(σroute(rt ,dip))
if σroute(rt ,dip) is defined
unk otherwise .
(c) The validity status of a recorded route:
flag : RT× IP⇀ F
flag(rt ,dip) := π4(σroute(rt ,dip)) .
(d) The hop count of the route from the current node
(hosting rt) to dip:
dhops : RT× IP⇀ IN
dhops(rt ,dip) := π5(σroute(rt ,dip)) .
(e) The identity of the next node on the route to dip (if
such a route is known):
nhop : RT× IP⇀ IP
nhop(rt ,dip) := π6(σroute(rt ,dip)) .
(f) The set of precursors or neighbours interested in
using the route from ip to dip:
precs : RT× IP⇀ P(IP)
precs(rt ,dip) := π7(σroute(rt ,dip)) .
The domain of these partial functions changes during
the operation of AODV as more routes are discovered
and recorded in the routing table rt. The first two func-
tions are extended to be total functions: whenever there
is no route to dip inside the routing table under con-
sideration, the sequence number is set to “unknown”
(0) and the sequence-number-status flag is set to “un-
known” (unk), respectively. In the same style each par-
tial function could be turned into a total one. However,
in the specification we use these functions only when
they are defined.
We are not only interested in information about a
single route, but also in information on a routing table:
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(a) The set of destination IP addresses for valid routes
in rt is given by
vD : RT→ P(IP)
vD(rt) := {dip | (dip ,∗ ,∗ ,val ,∗ ,∗ ,∗) ∈ rt} .13
(b) The set of destination IP addresses for invalid
routes in rt is
iD : RT→ P(IP)
iD(rt) := {dip | (dip ,∗ ,∗ ,inv ,∗ ,∗ ,∗) ∈ rt} .
(c) Last, we define the set of destination IP addresses
for known routes by
kD : RT→ P(IP)
kD(rt) := vD(rt) ∪ iD(rt)
= {dip | (dip ,∗ ,∗ ,∗ ,∗ ,∗ ,∗) ∈ rt} .
The partial functions σroute, flag, dhops, nhop and
precs are defined for rt and dip iff dip ∈ kD(rt).
4.5 Updating Routing Tables
Routing tables can be updated for three principal rea-
sons. The first is when a node needs to adjust its list of
precursors relative to a given destination; the second is
when a received request or response carries information
about network connectivity; and the last when informa-
tion is received to the effect that a previously valid route
should now be considered invalid. We define an update
function for each case.
4.5.1 Updating Precursor Lists
Recall that the precursors of a given node ip relative to
a particular destination dip are the nodes that are “in-
terested” in a route to dip via ip. The function addpre
takes a routing table entry and a set of IP addresses
npre and updates the entry by adding npre to the list
of precursors already present:
addpre : R×P(IP)→ R
addpre((dip ,dsn ,dsk ,flag ,hops ,nhip ,pre) ,npre) :=
(dip ,dsn ,dsk ,flag ,hops ,nhip ,pre ∪ npre) .
Often it is necessary to add precursors to an entry of
a given routing table. For that, we define the function
addpreRT, which takes a routing table rt , a destination
dip and a set of IP addresses npre and updates the
entry with destination dip by adding npre to the list of
13 We use “∗” as a wildcard.
precursors already present. It is only defined if an entry
for destination dip exists.
addpreRT : RT× IP×P(IP)⇀ RT
addpreRT(rt ,dip ,npre) := (rt− {σroute(rt ,dip)})
∪ {addpre(σroute(rt ,dip) ,npre)}
Formally, we remove the entry with destination dip from
the routing table and insert a new entry for that desti-
nation. This new entry is the same as before—only the
precursors have been added.
4.5.2 Inserting New Information in Routing Tables
If a node gathers new information about a route to a
destination dip, then it updates its routing table de-
pending on its existing information on a route to dip.
If no route to dip was known at all, it inserts a new
entry in its routing table recording the information re-
ceived. If it already has some (partial) information then
it may update this information, depending on whether
the new route is fresher or shorter than the one it has
already. We define an update function update(rt , r)
of a routing table rt with an entry r only when r is
valid, i.e., π4(r) = val, π2(r) = 0 ⇔ π3(r) = unk, and
π3(r) = unk ⇒ π5(r) = 1. After we have introduced
our formal specification for AODV in Section 5, we will
show that we only use the function update if this con-
dition is satisfied (Proposition 15); hence this definition
is sufficient.
update : RT× R ⇀ RT
update(rt ,r) :=

rt ∪ {r} if π1(r) 6∈ kD(rt)
nrt ∪ {nr} if π1(r) ∈ kD(rt)
∧ sqn(rt ,π1(r)) < π2(r)
nrt ∪ {nr} if π1(r) ∈ kD(rt)
∧ sqn(rt ,π1(r)) = π2(r)
∧ dhops(rt , π1(r)) > π5(r)
nrt ∪ {nr} if π1(r) ∈ kD(rt)
∧ sqn(rt ,π1(r)) = π2(r)
∧ flag(rt ,π1(r)) = inv
nrt ∪ {nr′} if π1(r) ∈ kD(rt)
∧ π3(r) = unk
nrt ∪ {ns} otherwise ,
where s := σroute(rt , π1(r)) is the current entry in
the routing table for the destination of r (if it exists),
and nrt := rt − {s} is the routing table without that
entry. The entry nr := addpre(r , π7(s)) is identical
to r except that the precursors from s are added and
ns := addpre(s , π7(r)) is generated from s by adding
the precursors from r. Lastly, nr′ is identical to nr ex-
cept that the sequence number is replaced by the one
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from the route s. More precisely, nr′ := (dipnr , π2(s) ,
dsknr , flagnr , hopsnr , nhipnr , prenr) if nr = (dipnr , ∗ ,
dsknr,flagnr,hopsnr,nhipnr,prenr). In the situation where
sqn(rt,π1(r)) = π2(r) both routes nr and nr
′ are equal.
Therefore, though the cases of the above definition are
not mutually exclusive, the function is well defined.
The first case describes the situation where the rout-
ing table does not contain any information on a route
to dip. The second case models the situation where the
new route has a greater sequence number. As a conse-
quence all the information from the incoming informa-
tion is copied into the routing table. In the third and
fourth case the sequence numbers are the same and can-
not be used to identify better information. Hence other
measures are used. The route inside the routing table
is only replaced if either the new hop count is strictly
smaller—a shorter route has been found—or if the route
inside the routing table is marked as invalid. The fifth
case deals with the situation where a new route to a
known destination has been found without any informa-
tion on its sequence number (π2(r) = 0 ∧ π3(r) = unk).
In that case the routing table entry to that destination
is always updated, but the existing sequence number is
maintained, and marked as “unknown”.
Note that we do not update if we receive a new entry
where the sequence number and the hop count are iden-
tical to the current entry in the routing table. Following
the RFC, the time period (till the valid route becomes
invalid) should be reset; however at the moment we do
not model timing aspects.
4.5.3 Invalidating Routes
Invalidating routes is a main feature of AODV; if a route
is not valid any longer its validity flag has to be set to
invalid. By doing this, the stored information about the
route, such as the sequence number or the hop count, re-
mains accessible. The process of invalidating a routing
table entry follows four rules: (a) any sequence num-
ber is incremented by 1, except (b) the truly unknown
sequence number (sqn = 0, which will only occur if
dsk = unk) is not incremented, (c) the validity flag of
the entry is set to inv, and (d) an invalid entry cannot
be invalidated again. However, in exception to (a) and
(b), when the invalidation is in response to an error
message, this message also contains a new (and already
incremented) sequence number for each destination to
be invalidated.
The function for invalidating routing table entries
takes as arguments a routing table and a set of desti-
nations dests ∈ P(IP × SQN). Elements of this set are
(rip, rsn)-pairs that not only identify an unreachable
destination rip, but also a sequence number that de-
scribes the freshness of the faulty route. As for routing
tables, we restrict ourselves to sets that have at most
one entry for each destination; this time we formally
define dests as a partial function from IP to SQN, i.e. a
subset of IP× SQN satisfying
(rip ,rsn), (rip ,rsn′) ∈ dests ⇒ rsn = rsn′ .
We use the variable dests to range over such sets.
When invoking invalidate we either distil dests from
an error message, or determine dests as a set of pairs
(rip, inc(sqn(rt , rip)), where the operator inc (from
Section 4.2) takes care of (a) and (b). Moreover, we
will distil or construct dests in such a way that it only
lists destinations for which there is a valid entry in the
routing table—this takes care of (d).
invalidate : RT× (IP ⇀ SQN)→ RT
invalidate(rt ,dests) := {r ∈ rt | (π1(r), ∗) 6∈ dests}
∪{(π1(r) , rsn ,π3(r) ,inv , π5(r) , π6(r) , π7(r)) |
r ∈ rt ∧ (π1(r), rsn) ∈ dests}
All entries in the routing table for a destination rip in
dests are modified. The modification replaces the value
val by inv and the sequence number in the entry by
the corresponding sequence number from dests.
Copying the sequence number from dests leaves the
possibility that the destination sequence number of an
entry is decreased, which would violate one of the fun-
damental assumption of AODV and may yield unex-
pected behaviour. However, we will show that a de-
crease of a destination sequence number does not occur
in our model of AODV.
4.6 Route Requests
A route request—RREQ—for a destination dip is ini-
tiated by a node (with routing table rt) if this node
wants to transmit a data packet to dip but there is no
valid entry for dip in the routing table, i.e. dip 6∈vD(rt).
When a new route request is sent out it contains the
identity of the originating node oip, and a route request
identifier (RREQ ID); the type of all such identifiers
is denoted by RREQID, and the variable rreqid ranges
over this type. This information does not change, even
when the request is re-broadcast by any receiving node
that does not already know a route to the requested
destination. In this way any request still circulating
through the network can be uniquely identified by the
pair (oip, rreqid) ∈ IP × RREQID. For our specification
we set RREQID = IN. In our model, each node maintains
a variable rreqs of type P(IP×RREQID) of sets of such
pairs to store the sets of route requests seen by the node
so far. Within this set, the node records the requests it
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has previously initiated itself. To ensure a fresh rreqid
for each new RREQ it generates, the node ip applies
the following function:
nrreqid : P(IP× RREQID)× IP→ RREQID
nrreqid(rreqs , ip) := max{n | (ip, n) ∈ rreqs}+ 1 ,
where we take the maximum of the empty set to be 0.
4.7 Queued Packets
Strictly speaking the task of sending data packets is
not regarded as part of the AODV protocol—however,
failure to send a packet because either a route to the
destination is unknown, or a previously known route
has become invalid, prompts AODV to be activated.
In our modelling we describe this interaction between
packet sending and AODV, providing the minimal in-
frastructure for our specification.
If a new packet is submitted by a client of AODV
to a node, it may need to be stored until a route to the
packet’s destination has been found and the node is not
busy carrying out other AODV tasks. We use a queue-
style data structure for modelling the store of packets
at a node, noting that at each node there may be many
data queues, one for each destination. In general, we de-
note queues of type TYPE by [TYPE], denote the empty
queue by [ ], and make use of the standard (partial)
functions head : [TYPE]⇀ TYPE, tail : [TYPE] ⇀ [TYPE]
and append : TYPE × [TYPE] → [TYPE] that return the
“oldest” element in the queue, remove the “oldest” el-
ement, and add a packet to the queue, respectively.
The data type
STORE :=
{
store ∈ P(IP× P× [DATA]) |(
(dip , p , q), (dip , p′, q′) ∈ store⇒ p= p′ ∧ q= q′
)}
describes stores of enqueued data packets for various
destinations, where P := {no-req, req}. An element
(dip, p, q) ∈ IP×P× [DATA] denotes the queue q of pack-
ets destined for dip; the request-required flag p is req if
a new route discovery process for dip still needs to be
initiated, i.e., a route request message needs to be sent.
The value no-req indicates that such a RREQ message
has been sent already, and either the reply is still pend-
ing or a route to dip has been established. The flag is
set to req when a routing table entry is invalidated.
As for routing tables, we require that there is at
most one entry for every IP address. In our model, each
node maintains a variable store of type STORE to record
its current store of data packets.
We define some functions for inspecting a store:
(a) Similar to σroute, we need a function that is able
to extract the queue for a given destination:
σqueue : STORE× IP→ [DATA]
σqueue(store ,dip) :=
{
q if (dip ,∗ ,q) ∈ store
[ ] otherwise .
(b) We define a function qD to extract the destinations
for which there are unsent packets:
qD : STORE→ P(IP)
qD(store) := {dip | (dip ,∗ ,∗) ∈ store} .
Next, we define operations for adding and removing
data packets from a store.
(c) Adding a data packet for a particular destination
to a store is defined by:
add : DATA× IP× STORE→ STORE
add(d ,dip , store) :=

store ∪ {(dip ,req ,append(d , [ ]))}
if (dip ,∗ ,∗) /∈ store
store− {(dip, p, q)} ∪ {(dip , p ,append(d , q))}
if (dip , p , q) ∈ store .
Informally, the process selects the entry (dip, p , q) ∈
store ∈ STORE, where dip is the destination of the
application layer data d, and appends d to queue
q of dip in that triple; the request-required flag p
remains unchanged. In case there is no entry for
dip in store, the process creates a new queue [d] of
stored packets that only contains the data packet
under consideration and inserts it—together with
dip—into the store; the request-required flag is set
to req, since a route request needs to be sent.
(d) To delete the oldest packet for a particular desti-
nation from a store, we define:
drop : IP× STORE⇀ STORE
drop(dip ,store) :=

store− {(dip ,∗ , q)}
if tail(q) = [ ]
store− {(dip , p , q)} ∪ {(dip , p ,tail(q))}
otherwise ,
where q = σqueue(store , dip) is the selected queue
for destination dip. If dip 6∈ qD(store) then q = [ ].
Therefore tail(q) and hence also drop(dip,store) is
undefined. Note that if d is the last queued packet
for a specific destination, the whole entry for the
destination is removed from store.
In our model of AODV we use only add and drop to
update a store. This ensures that the store will never
contain a triple (dip ,∗ , [ ]) with an empty data queue,
that is
dip ∈ qD(store)⇒ σqueue(store ,dip) 6= [ ] . (1)
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Finally, we define operations for reading and manipu-
lating the request-required flag of a queue.
(e) We define a partial function σp-flag to extract the
flag for a destination for which there are unsent
packets:
σp-flag : STORE× IP ⇀ P
σp-flag(store ,dip) :=
{
p if (dip, p, ∗) ∈ store
undefined otherwise .
(f) To change the status of the request-required flag,
we define functions setRRF and unsetRRF. After a
route request for destination dip has been initiated,
the request-required flag for dip has to be set to
no-req.
unsetRRF : STORE× IP→ STORE
unsetRRF(store ,dip) :=

store− {(dip, ∗, q)} ∪ {(dip, no-req, q)}
if {(dip, ∗, q)} ∈ store
store otherwise .
In case that there is no queued data for destination
dip, the store remains unchanged.
Whenever a route is invalidated the correspond-
ing request-required flag has to be set to req; this
indicates that the protocol might need to initiate
a new route discovery process. Since the function
invalidate invalidates sets of routing table en-
tries, we define a function with a set of destinations
dests ∈ P(IP×SQN) as one of its arguments (anno-
tated with sequence numbers, which are not used
here).
setRRF : STORE× (IP ⇀ SQN)→ STORE
setRRF(store ,dests) :=
{(dip , p , q) ∈ store | (dip ,∗) /∈ dests}
∪ {(dip ,req , q) | (dip , p , q) ∈ store
∧ (dip ,∗) ∈ dests} .
4.8 Messages and Message Queues
Messages are the main ingredient of any routing proto-
col. The message types used in the AODV protocol are
route request, route reply, and route error. To generate
theses messages, we use functions
rreq : IN×RREQID× IP× SQN× K× IP× SQN× IP
→ MSG
rrep : IN×IP× SQN× IP× IP→ MSG
rerr : (IP ⇀ SQN)× IP→ MSG .14
The function rreq(hops,rreqid,dip,dsn,dsk,oip,osn,sip)
generates a route request. Here, hops indicates the hop
14 The ordering of the arguments follows the RFC.
count from the originator oip—that, at the time of send-
ing, had the sequence number osn—to the sender of
the message sip; rreqid uniquely identifies the route re-
quest; dsn is the least level of freshness of a route to
dip that is acceptable to oip—it has been obtained by
incrementing the latest sequence number received in
the past by oip for a route towards dip; and dsk in-
dicates whether we can trust that number. In case no
sequence number is known, dsn is set to 0 and dsk to
unk. By rrep(hops ,dip ,dsn,oip ,sip) a route reply mes-
sage is obtained. Originally, it was generated by dip—
where dsn denotes the sequence number of dip at the
time of sending—and is destined for oip; the last sender
of the message was the node with IP address sip and
the distance between dip and sip is given by hops. The
error message is generated by rerr(dests , sip), where
dests : IP ⇀ SQN is the list of unreachable destinations
and sip denotes the sender. Every unreachable desti-
nation rip comes together with the incremented last-
known sequence number rsn.
Next to these AODV control messages, we use for
our specification also data packets: messages that carry
application layer data.
newpkt : DATA× IP→ MSG
pkt : DATA× IP× IP→ MSG
Although these messages are not part of the protocol
itself, they are necessary to initiate error messages, and
to trigger the route discovery process. newpkt(d , dip)
generates a message containing new application layer
data d destined for a particular destination dip. Such
a message is submitted to a node by a client of the
AODV protocol hooked up to that node. The function
pkt(d,dip,sip) generates a message containing applica-
tion layer data d , that is sent by the sender sip to the
next hop on the route towards dip.
All messages received by a particular node are first
stored in a queue (see Section 5.6 for a detailed descrip-
tion). To model this behaviour we use a message queue,
denoted by the variable msgs of type [MSG]. As for every
other queue, we will freely use the functions head, tail
and append.
Table 2 provides a summary of the entire data struc-
ture we use.
5 Modelling AODV
Our formalisation of AODV tries to accurately model
the protocol as defined in the IETF RFC 3561 specifica-
tion [39]. The model focusses on layer 3 of the protocol
stack, i.e., the routing and forwarding of messages and
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Table 2 Data structure
Basic Type Variables Description
IP ip, dip, oip, rip, sip, nhip node identifiers
SQN dsn, osn, rsn, sn sequence numbers
K dsk sequence-number-status flag
F flag route validity
IN hops hop counts
R r routing table entries
RT rt routing tables
RREQID rreqid request identifiers
P request-required flag
DATA data application layer data
STORE store store of queued data packets
MSG msg messages
Complex Type Variables Description
[TYPE] queues with elements of type TYPE
[MSG] msgs message queues
P(TYPE) sets consisting of elements of type TYPE
P(IP) pre sets of identifiers (precursors, destinations, . . . )
P(IP × RREQID) rreqs sets of request identifiers with originator IP
TYPE1 ⇀ TYPE2 partial functions from TYPE1 to TYPE2
IP ⇀ SQN dests sets of destinations with sequence numbers
Constant/Predicate Description
0 : SQN, 1 : SQN unknown, smallest sequence number
< ⊆ SQN × SQN strict order on sequence numbers
kno, unk : K constants to distinguish known and unknown sqns
val, inv : F constants to distinguish valid and invalid routes
no-req, req : P constants indicating whether a RREQ is required
0 : IN, 1 : IN, < ⊆ IN× IN standard constants/predicates of natural numbers
[ ] : [TYPE], ∅ : P(TYPE) empty queue, empty set
∈ ⊆ TYPE ×P(TYPE) membership, standard set theory
Function Description
head : [TYPE]⇀ TYPE returns the “oldest” element in the queue
tail : [TYPE]⇀ [TYPE] removes the “oldest” element in the queue
append : TYPE × [TYPE]→ [TYPE] inserts a new element into the queue
drop : IP × STORE ⇀ STORE deletes a packet from the queued data packets
add : DATA × IP× STORE → STORE adds a packet to the queued data packets
unsetRRF : STORE × IP→ STORE set the request-required flag to no-req
setRRF : STORE × (IP ⇀ SQN)→ STORE set the request-required flag to req
σqueue : STORE × IP→ [DATA] selects the data queue for a particular destination
σp-flag : STORE × IP⇀ P selects the flag for a destination from the store
σroute : RT × IP⇀ R selects the route for a particular destination
( , , , , , , ) : IP×SQN×K×F× IN×IP×P(IP)→ R generates a routing table entry
inc : SQN→ SQN increments the sequence number
max : SQN × SQN→ SQN returns the larger sequence number
sqn : RT × IP→ SQN returns the sequence number of a particular route
sqnf : RT × IP→ K determines whether the sequence number is known
flag : RT × IP ⇀ F returns the validity of a particular route
+1 : IN→ IN increments the hop count
dhops : RT × IP⇀ IN returns the hop count of a particular route
nhop : RT × IP ⇀ IP returns the next hop of a particular route
precs : RT × IP⇀ P(IP) returns the set of precursors of a particular route
vD, iD, kD : RT→ P(IP) returns the set of valid, invalid, known destinations
qD : STORE → P(IP) returns the set of destinations with unsent packets
∩, ∪,
⋃
{. . .}, . . . standard set-theoretic functions
addpre : R ×P(IP)→ R adds a set of precursors to a routing table entry
addpreRT : RT × IP ×P(IP)⇀ RT adds a set of precursors to an entry inside a table
update : RT × R⇀ RT updates a routing table with a route (if fresh enough)
invalidate : RT × (IP ⇀ SQN)→ RT invalidates a set of routes within a routing table
nrreqid : P(IP × RREQID)× IP→ RREQID generates a new route request identifier
newpkt : DATA × IP→ MSG generates a message with new application layer data
pkt : DATA × IP× IP→ MSG generates a message containing application layer data
rreq : IN×RREQID×IP×SQN×K×IP×SQN×IP→ MSG generates a route request
rrep : IN×IP × SQN × IP× IP→ MSG generates a route reply
rerr : (IP ⇀ SQN)× IP→ MSG generates a route error message
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packets, and abstracts from lower layer network proto-
cols and mechanisms such as the Carrier Sense Multiple
Access (CSMA) protocol.
The presented formalisation includes all core com-
ponents of the protocol, but, at the moment, abstracts
from timing issues and optional protocol features. This
keeps our specification manageable. A consequence of
not modelling timing issues is that statements such as
“Can a route expire before a data packet is transmit-
ted?” [9] cannot be analysed, for in our model routes do
not expire at all. Our plan is to extend our model step
by step. The model allows us to reason about protocol
behaviour and to prove critical protocol characteristics.
A detailed list of abstractions made can be found in [16,
Section 3].
In this section, we present a specification of the
AODV protocol using process algebra. The model in-
cludes a mechanism to describe the delivery of data
packets; though this is not part of the protocol itself it
is necessary to trigger any AODV activity. Our model
consists of 7 processes, named AODV, NEWPKT, PKT, RREQ,
RREP, RERR and QMSG:
– The basic process AODV reads a message from the
message queue and, depending on the type of the
message, calls other processes. When there is no
message handling going on, the process initiates the
transmission of queued data packets or generates a
new route request (if packets are stored for a des-
tination, no route to this destination is known and
no route request for this destination is pending).
– The processes NEWPKT and PKT describe all actions
performed by a node when a data packet is received.
The former process handles a newly injected packet.
The latter describes all actions performed when a
node receives data from another node via the proto-
col. This includes accepting the packet (if the node is
the destination), forwarding the packet (if the node
is not the destination) and sending an error message
(if forwarding fails).
– The process RREQ models all events that might oc-
cur after a route request has been received. This
includes updating the node’s routing table, forward-
ing the route request as well as the initiation of a
route reply if a route to the destination is known.
– Similarly, the RREP process describes the reaction of
the protocol to an incoming route reply.
– The process RERR models the part of AODV which
handles error messages. In particular, it describes
the modification and forwarding of the AODV error
message.
– The last process QMSG concerns message handling.
Whenever a message is received, it is first stored in
a message queue. If the corresponding node is able
to handle a message it pops the oldest message from
the queue and handles it. An example where a node
is not ready to process an incoming message imme-
diately is when it is already handling a message.
In the remainder of the section, we provide a for-
mal specification for each of these processes and ex-
plain them step by step. Our specification can be split
into three parts: the brown lines describe updates to be
performed on the node’s data, e.g., its routing table;
the black lines are other process algebra constructs (cf.
Section 3); and the blue lines are ordinary comments.
5.1 The Basic Routine
The basic process AODV either reads a message from the
corresponding queue, sends a queued data packet if a
route to the destination has been established, or initi-
ates a new route discovery process in case of queued
data packets with invalid or unknown routes. This pro-
cess maintains five data variables, ip, sn, rt, rreqs
and store, in which it stores its own identity, its own
sequence number, its current routing table, the list of
route requests seen, and its current store of queued data
packets that await transmission (cf. Section 4).
The message handling is described in Lines 1–20.
First, the message has to be read from the queue of
stored messages (receive(msg)). After that, the process
AODV checks the type of the message and calls a process
that can handle the message: in case of a newly in-
jected data packet, the process NEWPKT is called; in case
of an incoming data packet, the process PKT is called;
in case that the incoming message is an AODV control
message (route request, route reply or route error), the
node updates its routing table. More precisely, if there is
no entry to the message’s sender sip, the receiver-node
creates an entry with the unknown sequence number 0
and hop count 1; in case there is already a routing ta-
ble entry (sip, dsn, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, pre), then this entry is up-
dated to (sip, dsn, unk, val, 1, sip, pre) (cf. Lines 10,
14 and 18). Afterwards, the processes RREQ, RREP and
RERR are called, respectively.
The second part of AODV (Lines 21–32) initiates the
sending of a data packet. For that, it has to be checked if
there is a queued data packet for a destination that has
a known and valid route in the routing table (qD(store)
∩vD(rt) 6= ∅). In case that there is more than one desti-
nation with stored data and a known route, an arbitrary
destination is chosen and denoted by dip (Line 21).15
Moreover data is set to the first queued data packet
from the application layer that should be sent (data :=
15 Although the word “let” is not part of the syntax, we add
it to stress the nondeterminism happening here.
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Process 1 The basic routine
AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
def
=
1. receive(msg) .
2. /* depending on the message, the node calls different processes */
3. (
4. [ msg = newpkt(data ,dip) ] /* new DATA packet */
5. NEWPKT(data ,dip , ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
6. + [ msg = pkt(data ,dip ,oip) ] /* incoming DATA packet */
7. PKT(data ,dip ,oip , ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
8. + [ msg = rreq(hops ,rreqid ,dip ,dsn ,dsk ,oip ,osn ,sip) ] /* RREQ */
9. /* update the route to sip in rt */
10. [[rt := update(rt , (sip, 0, unk, val, 1, sip, ∅))]] /* 0 is used since no sequence number is known */
11. RREQ(hops ,rreqid ,dip ,dsn ,dsk ,oip ,osn ,sip , ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
12. + [ msg = rrep(hops ,dip ,dsn ,oip ,sip) ] /* RREP */
13. /* update the route to sip in rt */
14. [[rt := update(rt , (sip, 0, unk, val, 1, sip, ∅))]]
15. RREP(hops ,dip ,dsn ,oip ,sip , ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
16. + [ msg = rerr(dests ,sip) ] /* RERR */
17. /* update the route to sip in rt */
18. [[rt := update(rt , (sip, 0, unk, val, 1, sip, ∅))]]
19. RERR(dests ,sip , ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
20. )
21. + [ Let dip ∈ qD(store) ∩ vD(rt) ] /* send a queued data packet if a valid route is known */
22. [[data := head(σqueue(store ,dip))]]
23. unicast(nhop(rt ,dip) ,pkt(data ,dip ,ip)) .
24. [[store := drop(dip ,store)]] /* drop data from the store for dip if the transmission was successful */
25. AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
26. ◮ /* an error is produced and the routing table is updated */
27. [[dests := {(rip, inc(sqn(rt ,rip))) | rip ∈ vD(rt) ∧ nhop(rt ,rip) = nhop(rt ,dip)}]]
28. [[rt := invalidate(rt ,dests)]]
29. [[store := setRRF(store ,dests)]]
30. [[pre :=
⋃
{precs(rt ,rip) | (rip, ∗) ∈ dests}]]
31. [[dests := {(rip, rsn) | (rip, rsn) ∈ dests ∧ precs(rt ,rip) 6= ∅}]]
32. groupcast(pre ,rerr(dests ,ip)) . AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
33. + [ Let dip ∈ qD(store)− vD(rt) ∧ σp-flag(store ,dip) = req ] /* a route discovery process is initiated */
34. [[store := unsetRRF(store ,dip)]] /* set request-required flag to no-req */
35. [[sn := inc(sn)]] /* increment own sequence number */
36. /* update rreqs by adding (ip, nrreqid(rreqs ,ip)) */
37. [[rreqid := nrreqid(rreqs ,ip)]]
38. [[rreqs := rreqs ∪ {(ip, rreqid)}]]
39. broadcast(rreq(0 ,rreqid ,dip ,sqn(rt ,dip) ,sqnf(rt ,dip) ,ip ,sn ,ip)) . AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
head(σqueue(store , dip))).
16 This data packet is uni-
cast to the next hop on the route to dip. If the unicast is
successful, the data packet data is removed from store
(Line 24). Finally, the process calls itself—stating that
the node is ready for handling a new message, initiat-
ing the sending of another packet towards a destina-
tion, etc. In case the unicast is not successful, the data
packet has not been transmitted. Therefore data is not
removed from store. Moreover, the node knows that
the link to the next hop on the route to dip is faulty
and, most probably, broken. An error message is initi-
ated. Generally, route error and link breakage process-
ing requires the following steps: (a) invalidating existing
routing table entries, (b) listing affected destinations,
(c) determining which neighbours may be affected (if
16 Following the RFC, data packets waiting for a route
should be buffered “first-in, first-out” (FIFO).
any), and (d) delivering an appropriate AODV error
message to such neighbours [39]. Therefore, the pro-
cess determines all valid destinations dests that have
this unreachable node as next hop (Line 27) and marks
the routing table entries for these destinations as in-
valid (Line 28), while incrementing their sequence num-
bers (Line 27). In Line 29, we set, for all invalidated
routing table entries, the request-required flag to req,
thereby indicating that a new route discovery process
may need to be initiated. In Line 30 the recipients of the
error message are determined. These are the precursors
of the invalidated destinations, i.e., the neighbouring
nodes listed as having a route to one of the affected
destinations passing through the broken link. Finally,
an error message is sent to them (Line 32), listing only
those invalidated destinations with a non-empty set of
precursors (Line 31).
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Process 2 Routine for handling a newly injected data packet
NEWPKT(data ,dip , ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
def
=
1. [ dip = ip ] /* the DATA packet is intended for this node */
2. deliver(data) . AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
3. + [ dip 6= ip ] /* the DATA packet is not intended for this node */
4. [[store := add(data ,dip ,store)]] . AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
The third and final part of AODV (Lines 33–39) initi-
ates a route discovery process. This is done when there
is at least one queued data packet for a destination
without a valid routing table entry, that is not wait-
ing for a reply in response to a route request process
initiated before. Following the RFC, the process gen-
erates a new route request. This is achieved in four
steps: First, the request-required flag is set to no-req
(Line 34), meaning that no further route discovery pro-
cesses for this destination need to be initiated.17 Sec-
ond, the node’s own sequence number is increased by 1
(Line 35). Third, by determining nrreqid(rreqs ,ip),
a new route request identifier is created and stored—
together with the node’s ip—in the set rreqs of route
requests already seen (Line 38). Fourth, the message
itself is sent (Line 39) using broadcast. In contrast to
unicast, transmissions via broadcast are not checked
on success. The information inside the message follows
strictly the RFC. In particular, the hop count is set
to 0, the route request identifier previously created is
used, etc. This ends the initiation of the route discovery
process.
5.2 Data Packet Handling
The processes NEWPKT and PKT describe all actions
performed by a node when a data packet is injected by
a client hooked up to the local node or received via the
protocol, respectively. For the process PKT, this includes
the acceptance (if the node is the destination), the for-
warding (if the node is not the destination), as well
as the sending of an error message in case something
went wrong. The process NEWPKT does not include the
initiation of a new route request; this is part of the pro-
cess AODV. Although packet handling itself is not part
of AODV, it is necessary to include it in our formalisa-
tion, since a failure to transmit a data packet triggers
AODV activity.
The process NEWPKT first checks whether the node is
the intended addressee of the data packet. If this is the
case, it delivers the data and returns to the basic routine
AODV. If the node is not the intended destination (dip 6=
17 The RFC does not describe packet handling in detail;
hence the request-required flag is not part of the RFC’s
RREQ generation process.
ip, Line 3), the data is added to the data queue for
dip (Line 4),18 which finishes the handling of a newly
injected data packet. The further handling of queued
data (forwarding it to the next hop on the way to the
destination in case a valid route to the destination is
known, and otherwise initiating a new route request if
still required) is the responsibility of the main process
AODV.
Similar to NEWPKT, the process PKT first checks if it
is the intended addressee of the data packet. If this is
the case, it delivers the data and returns to the basic
routine AODV. If the node is not the intended destination
(dip 6= ip, Line 3) more activity is needed.
In case that the node has a valid route to the data’s
destination dip (dip ∈ vD(rt)), it forwards the packet
using a unicast to the next hop nhop(rt , dip) on the
way to dip. Similar to the unicast of the process AODV,
it has to be checked whether the transmission is suc-
cessful: no further action is necessary if the transmis-
sion succeeds, and the node returns to the basic routine
AODV. If the transmission fails, the link to the next hop
nhop(rt , dip) is assumed to be broken. As before, all
destinations dests that are reached via that broken link
are determined (Line 9) and all precursors interested in
at least one of these destinations are informed via an
error message (Line 14). Moreover, all the routing ta-
ble entries using the broken link have to be invalidated
in the node’s routing table rt (Line 10), and all corre-
sponding request-required flags are set to req (Line 11).
In case that the node has no valid route to the des-
tination dip (dip 6∈ vD(rt)), the data packet is lost and
possibly an error message is sent. If there is an (invalid)
route to the data’s destination dip in the routing table
(Line 18), the possibly affected neighbours can be deter-
mined and the error message is sent to these precursors
(Line 20). If there is no information about a route to-
wards dip nothing happens (and the basic process AODV
is called again).
18 If no data for destination dip was already queued, the
function add creates a fresh queue for dip, and set the request-
required flag to req; otherwise, the request-required flag keeps
the value it had already.
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Process 3 Routine for handling a received data packet
PKT(data ,dip ,oip , ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
def
=
1. [ dip = ip ] /* the DATA packet is intended for this node */
2. deliver(data) . AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
3. + [ dip 6= ip ] /* the DATA packet is not intended for this node */
4. (
5. [ dip ∈ vD(rt) ] /* valid route to dip */
6. /* forward packet */
7. unicast(nhop(rt ,dip) ,pkt(data ,dip ,oip)) . AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
8. ◮ /* If the packet transmission is unsuccessful, a RERR message is generated */
9. [[dests := {(rip, inc(sqn(rt ,rip))) | rip ∈ vD(rt) ∧ nhop(rt ,rip) = nhop(rt ,dip)}]]
10. [[rt := invalidate(rt ,dests)]]
11. [[store := setRRF(store ,dests)]]
12. [[pre :=
⋃
{precs(rt ,rip) | (rip, ∗) ∈ dests}]]
13. [[dests := {(rip, rsn) | (rip, rsn) ∈ dests ∧ precs(rt ,rip) 6= ∅}]]
14. groupcast(pre ,rerr(dests ,ip)) . AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
15. + [ dip 6∈ vD(rt) ] /* no valid route to dip */
16. /* no local repair occurs; data is lost */
17. (
18. [ dip ∈ iD(rt) ] /* invalid route to dip */
19. /* if the route is invalid, a RERR is sent to the precursors */
20. groupcast(precs(rt ,dip) ,rerr({(dip, sqn(rt ,dip))} ,ip)) . AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
21. + [ dip 6∈ iD(rt) ] /* route not in rt */
22. AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
23. )
24. )
5.3 Receiving Route Requests
The process RREQ models all events that may occur
after a route request has been received.
RREQ first reads the unique identifier (oip, rreqid)
of the route request received. If this pair is already
stored in the node’s data rreqs, the route request has
been handled before and the message can silently be
ignored (Lines 1–2).
If the received message is new to this node, i.e.,
(oip, rreqid) 6∈ rreqs (Line 3) ,
the node establishes a route of length hops+1 back to
the originator oip of the message. If this route is “bet-
ter” than the route to oip in the current routing ta-
ble, the routing table is updated by this route (Line 4).
Moreover the unique identifier has to be added to the
set rreqs of already seen (and handled) route requests
(Line 5).
After these updates the process checks if the node
is the intended destination (dip = ip, Line 7). In that
case, a route reply must be initiated: first, the node’s
sequence number is—according to the RFC—set to the
maximum of the current sequence number and the des-
tination sequence number stemming from the RREQ
message (Line 8).Then the reply is unicast to the next
hop on the route back to the originator oip of the route
request. The content of the new route reply is as follows:
the hop count is set to 0, the destination and originator
are copied from the route request received and the des-
tination’s sequence number is the node’s own sequence
number sn; of course the sender’s IP of this message has
to be set to the node’s ip. As before (cf. Sections 5.1 and
5.2), the process invalidates the corresponding routing
table entries, sets request-required flags and sends an
error message to all relevant precursors if the unicast
transmission fails (Lines 12–17).
If the node is not the destination dip of the mes-
sage but an intermediate hop along the path from the
originator to the destination, it is allowed to generate
a route reply only if the information in its own rout-
ing table is fresh enough. This means that (a) the node
has a valid route to the destination, (b) the destination
sequence number in the node’s existing routing table
entry for the destination (sqn(rt ,dip)) is greater than
or equal to the requested destination sequence num-
ber dsn of the message and (c) the sequence number
sqn(rt , dip) is known, i.e., sqnf(rt , dip) = kno. If
these three conditions are satisfied—the check is done
in Line 20—the node generates a new route reply and
sends it to the next hop on the way back to the origi-
nator oip of the received route request.19. To this end,
it copies the sequence number for the destination dip
from the routing table rt into the destination sequence
number field of the RREP message and it places its dis-
tance in hops from the destination (dhops(rt ,dip)) in
the corresponding field of the new reply (Line 25). The
19 This next hop will often, but not always, be sip; see [16].
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Process 4 RREQ handling
RREQ(hops ,rreqid ,dip ,dsn ,dsk ,oip ,osn ,sip , ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
def
=
1. [ (oip , rreqid) ∈ rreqs ] /* the RREQ has been received previously */
2. AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store) /* silently ignore RREQ, i.e. do nothing */
3. + [ (oip , rreqid) 6∈ rreqs ] /* the RREQ is new to this node */
4. [[rt := update(rt , (oip, osn, kno, val, hops + 1, sip, ∅))]] /* update the route to oip in rt */
5. [[rreqs := rreqs ∪ {(oip, rreqid)}]] /* update rreqs by adding (oip , rreqid) */
6. (
7. [ dip = ip ] /* this node is the destination node */
8. [[sn := max(sn, dsn)]] /* update the sqn of ip */
9. /* unicast a RREP towards oip of the RREQ */
10. unicast(nhop(rt ,oip) ,rrep(0 ,dip ,sn ,oip ,ip)) . AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
11. ◮ /* If the transmission is unsuccessful, a RERR message is generated */
12. [[dests := {(rip, inc(sqn(rt ,rip))) | rip ∈ vD(rt) ∧ nhop(rt ,rip) = nhop(rt ,oip)}]]
13. [[rt := invalidate(rt ,dests)]]
14. [[store := setRRF(store ,dests)]]
15. [[pre :=
⋃
{precs(rt ,rip) | (rip, ∗) ∈ dests}]]
16. [[dests := {(rip, rsn) | (rip, rsn) ∈ dests ∧ precs(rt ,rip) 6= ∅}]]
17. groupcast(pre ,rerr(dests ,ip)) . AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
18. + [ dip 6= ip ] /* this node is not the destination node */
19. (
20. [ dip ∈ vD(rt) ∧ dsn ≤ sqn(rt ,dip) ∧ sqnf(rt ,dip) = kno ] /* valid route to dip that is fresh enough */
21. /* update rt by adding precursors */
22. [[rt := addpreRT(rt ,dip ,{sip})]]
23. [[rt := addpreRT(rt ,oip ,{nhop(rt ,dip)})]]
24. /* unicast a RREP towards the oip of the RREQ */
25. unicast(nhop(rt ,oip) ,rrep(dhops(rt ,dip) ,dip ,sqn(rt ,dip) ,oip ,ip)) .
26. AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
27. ◮ /* If the transmission is unsuccessful, a RERR message is generated */
28. [[dests := {(rip, inc(sqn(rt ,rip))) | rip ∈ vD(rt) ∧ nhop(rt ,rip) = nhop(rt ,oip)}]]
29. [[rt := invalidate(rt ,dests)]]
30. [[store := setRRF(store ,dests)]]
31. [[pre :=
⋃
{precs(rt ,rip) | (rip, ∗) ∈ dests}]]
32. [[dests := {(rip, rsn) | (rip, rsn) ∈ dests ∧ precs(rt ,rip) 6= ∅}]]
33. groupcast(pre ,rerr(dests ,ip)) . AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
34. + [ dip 6∈ vD(rt) ∨ sqn(rt ,dip) < dsn ∨ sqnf(rt ,dip) = unk ] /* no valid route that is fresh enough */
35. /* no further update of rt */
36. broadcast(rreq(hops+1 ,rreqid ,dip ,max(sqn(rt ,dip) ,dsn) ,dsk ,oip ,osn ,ip)) .
37. AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
38. )
39. )
unicast might fail, which causes the usual error han-
dling (Lines 28–33). Just before transmitting the uni-
cast, the intermediate node updates the forward route
entry to dip by placing the last hop node (sip)20 into
the precursor list for the forward route entry (Line 22).
Likewise, it updates the reverse route entry to oip by
placing the first hop nhop(rt ,dip) towards dip in the
precursor list for that entry (Line 23).21
If the node is not the destination and there is either
no route to the destination dip inside the routing ta-
ble or the route is not fresh enough, the route request
received has to be forwarded. This happens in Line 36.
The information inside the forwarded request is mostly
20 This is a mistake in the RFC; it should be nhop(rt ,oip).
21 Unless the gratuitous RREP flag is set, which we do not
model in this paper, this update is rather useless, as the pre-
cursor nhop(rt,dip) in general is not aware that it has a route
to oip.
copied from the request received. Only the hop count is
increased by 1 and the destination sequence number is
set to the maximum of the destination sequence number
in the RREQ packet and the current sequence number
for dip in the routing table. In case dip is an unknown
destination, sqn(rt,dip) returns the unknown sequence
number 0.
5.4 Receiving Route Replies
The process RREP describes the reaction of the proto-
col to an incoming route reply. Our model first checks
if a forward routing table entry is going to be created
or updated (Line 1). This is the case if (a) the node
has no known route to the destination, or (b) the desti-
nation sequence number in the node’s existing routing
table entry for the destination (sqn(rt,dip)) is smaller
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Process 5 RREP handling
RREP(hops ,dip ,dsn ,oip ,sip , ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
def
=
1. [ rt 6= update(rt , (dip ,dsn ,kno ,val ,hops + 1 ,sip ,∅)) ] /* the routing table has to be updated */
2. [[rt := update(rt , (dip ,dsn ,kno ,val ,hops + 1 ,sip ,∅))]]
3. (
4. [ oip = ip ] /* this node is the originator of the corresponding RREQ */
5. /* a packet may now be sent; this is done in the process AODV */
6. AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
7. + [ oip 6= ip ] /* this node is not the originator; forward RREP */
8. (
9. [ oip ∈ vD(rt) ] /* valid route to oip */
10. /* add next hop towards oip as precursor and forward the route reply */
11. [[rt := addpreRT(rt ,dip ,{nhop(rt ,oip)})]]
12. [[rt := addpreRT(rt ,nhop(rt ,dip) ,{nhop(rt ,oip)})]]
13. unicast(nhop(rt ,oip) ,rrep(hops+1 ,dip ,dsn ,oip ,ip)) .
14. AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
15. ◮ /* If the transmission is unsuccessful, a RERR message is generated */
16. [[dests := {(rip, inc(sqn(rt ,rip))) | rip ∈ vD(rt) ∧ nhop(rt ,rip) = nhop(rt ,oip)}]]
17. [[rt := invalidate(rt ,dests)]]
18. [[store := setRRF(store ,dests)]]
19. [[pre :=
⋃
{precs(rt ,rip) | (rip, ∗) ∈ dests}]]
20. [[dests := {(rip, rsn) | (rip, rsn) ∈ dests ∧ precs(rt ,rip) 6= ∅}]]
21. groupcast(pre ,rerr(dests ,ip)) . AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
22. + [ oip 6∈ vD(rt) ] /* no valid route to oip */
23. AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
24. )
25. )
26. + [ rt = update(rt , (dip ,dsn ,kno ,val ,hops + 1 ,sip ,∅)) ] /* the routing table is not updated */
27. AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
than the destination sequence number dsn in the RREP
message, or (c) the two destination sequence numbers
are equal and, in addition, either the incremented hop
count of the RREP received is strictly smaller than
the one in the routing table, or the entry for dip in
the routing table is invalid. Hence Line 1 could be re-
placed by
[dip 6∈ kD(rt)∨sqn(rt,dip)<dsn∨(sqn(rt,dip)=dsn
∧(dhops(rt,dip)>hops+1∨ flag(rt,dip)=inv))] . 22
In case that one of these conditions is true, the rout-
ing table is updated in Line 2. If the node is the in-
tended addressee of the route reply (oip = ip) the
protocol returns to its basic process AODV. Otherwise
(oip 6= ip) the message should be forwarded. Following
the RFC [39], “If the current node is not the node indi-
cated by the Originator IP Address in the RREP mes-
sage AND a forward route has been created or updated
[. . . ], the node consults its route table entry for the orig-
inating node to determine the next hop for the RREP
packet, and then forwards the RREP towards the orig-
22 In case dip 6∈ kD(rt), the terms dhops(rt , dip) and
flag(rt , dip) are not defined. In such a case, according to
the convention of Footnote 8 in Section 3, the atomic formu-
las dhops(rt,dip)>hops+1 and flag(rt,dip)=inv evaluate to
false. However, in case one would use lazy evaluation of the
outermost disjunction, the evaluation of the expression would
be independent of the choice of a convention for interpreting
undefined terms appearing in formulas.
inator using the information in that route table entry.”
This action needs a valid route to the originator oip
of the route request to which the current message is a
reply (oip ∈ vD(rt), Line 9). The content of the RREP
message to be sent is mostly copied from the RREP
received; only the sender has to be changed (it is now
the node’s ip) and the hop count is incremented. Prior
to the unicast, the node nhop(rt , oip), to which the
message is sent, is added to the list of precursors for the
routes to dip (Line 11) and to the next hop on the route
to dip (Line 12). Although not specified in the RFC, it
would make sense to also add a precursor to the reverse
route by [[rt := addpreRT(rt ,oip , {nhop(rt ,dip)})]].
As usual, if the unicast fails, the affected routing table
entries are invalidated and the precursors of all routes
using the broken link are determined and an error mes-
sage is sent (Lines 16–21). In the unlikely situation that
a reply should be forwarded but no valid route is known
by the node, nothing happens. Following the RFC, no
precursor has to be notified and no error message has
to be sent—even if there is an invalid route.
If a forward routing table entry is not created nor
updated, the reply is silently ignored and the basic pro-
cess is called (Lines 26–27).
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Process 6 RERR handling
RERR(dests ,sip , ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
def
=
1. /* invalidate broken routes */
2. [[dests := {(rip, rsn) | (rip, rsn) ∈ dests ∧ rip ∈ vD(rt) ∧ nhop(rt ,rip) = sip ∧ sqn(rt ,rip) < rsn}]]
3. [[rt := invalidate(rt ,dests)]]
4. [[store := setRRF(store ,dests)]]
5. /* forward the RERR to all precursors for rt entries for broken connections */
6. [[pre :=
⋃
{precs(rt ,rip) | (rip, ∗) ∈ dests}]]
7. [[dests := {(rip, rsn) | (rip, rsn) ∈ dests ∧ precs(rt ,rip) 6= ∅}]]
8. groupcast(pre ,rerr(dests ,ip)) . AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
5.5 Receiving Route Errors
The process RERR models the part of AODV that han-
dles error messages. An error message consists of a set
dests of pairs of an unreachable destination IP address
rip and the corresponding unreachable destination se-
quence number rsn.
If a node receives an error message from a neigh-
bour for one or more valid routes, it has—under some
conditions—to invalidate the entries for those routes in
its own routing table and forward the error message.
The node compares the set dests of unavailable desti-
nations from the incoming error message with its own
entries in the routing table. If the routing table lists a
valid route with a (rip, rsn)-combination from dests
and if the next hop on this route is the sender sip of
the error message, this entry may be affected by the
error message. In our formalisation, we have added the
requirement sqn(rt ,rip) < rsn, saying that the entry
is affected by the error message only if the “incoming”
sequence number is larger than the one stored in the
routing table, meaning that it is based on fresher infor-
mation.23 In this case, the entry has to be invalidated
and all precursors of this particular route have to be
informed. This has to be done for all affected routes.
In fact, the process first determines all (rip, rsn)-
pairs that have effects on its own routing table and
that may have to be forwarded as content of a new er-
ror message (Line 2). After that, all entries to unavail-
able destinations are invalidated (Line 3), and as usual
when routing table entries are invalidated, the request-
required flags are set to req (Line 4). In Line 6 the set of
all precursors (affected neighbours) of the unavailable
destinations are summarised in the set pre. Then, the
set dests is “thinned out” to only those destinations
that have at least one precursor— only these destina-
tions are transmitted in the forwarded error message
(Line 7). Finally, the message is sent (Line 8).
23 This additional requirement is in the spirit of Section 6.2
of the RFC [39] on updating routing table entries, but in
contradiction with Section 6.11 of the RFC on handling RERR
messages. In [20] we show that the reading of Section 6.11 of
the RFC gives rise to routing loops.
5.6 The Message Queue and Synchronisation
We assume that any message sent by a node sip to a
node ip that happens to be within transmission range of
sip is actually received by ip. For this reason, ip should
always be able to perform a receive action, regardless
of which state it is in. However, the main process AODV
that runs on the node ip can reach a state, such as PKT,
RREQ, RREP or RERR, in which it is not ready to perform
a receive action. For this reason we introduce a process
QMSG, modelling a message queue, that runs in parallel
with AODV or any other process that might be called.
Every incoming message is first stored in this queue,
and piped from there to the process AODV, whenever
AODV is ready to handle a new message. The process
QMSG is always ready to receive a new message, even
when AODV is not. The whole parallel process running
on a node is then given by an expression of the form
(ξ, AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)) 〈〈 (ζ, QMSG(msgs)) .
5.7 Initial State
To finish our specification, we have to define an ini-
tial state. The initial network expression is an encapsu-
lated parallel composition of node expressions ip :P :R,
where the (finite) number of nodes and the range R of
each node expression is left unspecified (can be any-
thing). However, each node in the parallel composition
is required to have a unique IP address ip. The initial
process P of ip is given by the expression
(ξ, AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)) 〈〈 (ζ, QMSG(msgs)) ,
with
ξ(ip) = ip ∧ ξ(sn) = 1 ∧ ξ(rt) = ∅ ∧ ξ(rreqs) = ∅
∧ ξ(store) = ∅ ∧ ζ(msgs) = [ ] .
(2)
This says that initially each node is correctly informed
about its own identity; its own sequence number is ini-
tialised with 1 and its routing table, the list of RREQs
seen, the store of queued data packets as well as the
message queue are empty.
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Process 7 Message queue
QMSG(msgs)
def
=
1. /* store incoming message at the end of msgs */
2. receive(msg) . QMSG(append(msg ,msgs))
3. + [ msgs 6= [ ] ] /* the queue is not empty */
4. (
5. /* pop top message and send it to another sequential process */
6. send(head(msgs)) . QMSG(tail(msgs))
7. /* or receive and store an incoming message */
8. + receive(msg) . QMSG(append(msg ,msgs))
9. )
6 Invariants
Using AWN and the proposed model of AODV we can
now formalise and prove crucial properties of AODV. In
this section we verify properties that can be expressed
as invariants, i.e., statements that hold all the time
when the protocol is executed.
The most important invariant we establish is loop
freedom; most prior results can be regarded as stepping
stones towards this goal. Next to that we also formalise
and discuss route correctness.
6.1 State and Transition Invariants
A (state) invariant is a statement that holds for all
reachable states of our model. Here states are network
expressions, as formally defined in [16] and described
in Section 3. An invariant is usually verified by show-
ing that it holds for all possible initial states, and that,
for any transition N ℓ−→ N ′ between network expres-
sions derived by our operational semantics, if it holds
for state N then it also holds for state N ′. In this paper
we abstain from a formal definition of the operational
semantics, and hence do not define the labelled tran-
sition relation −→ between network states. Instead we
verify invariants by checking that they are preserved
under any execution of any line in one of the Processes
1–7. In [16] we formally document that such a check
yields the required result.
Besides (state) invariants, we also establish state-
ments we call transition invariants. A transition invari-
ant is a statement that holds for each reachable tran-
sition N
ℓ−→ N ′ between network expressions derived
by the operational semantics. Again these transitions
correspond with lines in one of the Processes 1–7; they
either describe a relation between the states N and N ′
before and after executing the instruction—e.g. that the
value of a specific variable maintained by our processes
will never decrease—or they describe a relation between
the instruction being executed (such as a broadcast of
a message involving a certain value) and the state right
beforehand (such as a comparable value maintained by
the broadcasting node). Transition invariants are sim-
ply checked by going though all appropriate lines in
Processes 1–7. In a few cases we use induction on reach-
ability; this amounts to assuming that the same relation
holds for instructions executed earlier. Again we refer
to [16] for the soundness of this approach.
In our formalisation of transition invariants, we write
N R:*cast(m)−−−−−−−→ip N ′ to indicate that our network moves
from state N to state N ′ by means of a broadcast,
unicast or groupcast of the message m, executed by
node ip, while the current transmission range of this
node is R.
The following observations are crucial in establish-
ing many of our invariants.
Proposition 1
(a) With the exception of new packets that are submit-
ted to a node by a client of AODV, every message
received and handled by the main routine of AODV
has to be sent by some node before. More formally,
we consider an arbitrary path
N0
ℓ1−→ N1
ℓ2−→ . . . ℓk−→ Nk
with N0 an initial state in our model of AODV. If
the transition Nk−1
ℓk−→ Nk results from a synchro-
nisation involving the action receive(msg) from
Line 1 of Pro. 1—performed by the node ip—where
the variable msg is assigned the value m, then ei-
ther m = newpkt(d,dip) or one of the ℓi with i < k
stems from an action *cast(m) of a node ip′ of the
network.
(b) No node can receive a message directly from itself.
Using the formalisation above, we need ip 6= ip′.
Proof The only way Line 1 of Pro. 1 can be executed,
is through a synchronisation of the main process AODV
with the message queue QMSG (Pro. 6) running on the
same node. This involves the action send(m) of QMSG.
Here m is popped from the message queue msgs, which
started out empty. So at some point QMSG must have
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performed the action receive(m). However, this ac-
tion is blocked by the encapsulation operator [ ], except
when m has the form newpkt(d,dip) or when it synchro-
nises with an action *cast(m) of another node. ⊓⊔
At first glance Part(b) does not seem to reflect reality.
Of course, an application running on a local node has
to be able to send data packets to another application
running on the same node. However, in any practical
implementation, when a node sends a message to itself,
the message will be delivered to the corresponding ap-
plication on the local node without ever being “seen” by
AODV or any other routing protocol. Therefore, from
AODV’s perspective, no node can receive a message
(directly) from itself.
6.2 Notions and Notations
Before formalising and proving invariants, we introduce
some useful notions and notations.
All processes except QMSG maintain the five data
variables ip, sn, rt, rreqs and store. Next to that
QMSG maintains the variable msgs. Hence, these 6 vari-
ables can be evaluated at any time. Moreover, every
node expression in the transition system looks like
ip : (ξ, P 〈〈 ζ, QMSG(msgs)) : R ,
where P is a state in one of the following sequential
processes:
AODV(ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store) ,
NEWPKT(data ,dip , ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store) ,
PKT(data ,dip ,oip , ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store) ,
RREQ(hops ,rreqid ,dip ,dsn ,dsk ,oip ,osn ,sip ,
ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
RREP(hops ,dip ,dsn ,oip ,sip ,
ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store)
RERR(dests ,sip , ip ,sn ,rt ,rreqs ,store) .
Hence the state of the transition system for a node ip
is determined by the process P , the range R, and the
two valuations ξ and ζ. If a network consists of a (fi-
nite) set IP ⊆ IP of nodes, a reachable network expres-
sion N is an encapsulated parallel composition of node
expressions—one for each ip ∈ IP. In this section, we
assume N and N ′ to be reachable network expressions
in our model of AODV. To distill information about a
node from N , we define the following projections:
P ipN :=P, where ip :(∗, P 〈〈 ∗, ∗): ∗ is a node expr. of N,
RipN :=R, where ip : (∗, ∗ 〈〈 ∗, ∗) :R is a node expr. of N,
ξipN := ξ, where ip : (ξ, ∗ 〈〈 ∗, ∗) : ∗ is a node expr. of N,
ζipN := ζ, where ip : (∗, ∗ 〈〈 ζ, ∗) : ∗ is a node expr. of N.
For example, P ipN determines the sequential process the
node is currently working in, RipN denotes the set of all
nodes currently within transmission range of ip, and
ξipN (rt) evaluates the current routing table maintained
by node ip in the network expression N . In the forth-
coming proofs, when discussing the effects of an action,
identified by a line number in one of the processes of
our model, ξ denotes the current valuation ξipN , where
ip is the address of the local node, executing the action
under consideration, and N is the network expression
obtained right before this action occurs, corresponding
with the line number under consideration. When con-
sidering the effects of several actions, corresponding to
several line numbers, ξ is always interpreted most lo-
cally. For instance, in the proof of Proposition 12(a),
case Pro. 4, Line 36, we write
Hence . . . ipc := ξ(ip) = ip and ξ
ipc
N = ξ (by (3)).
At Line 4 we update the routing table using r :=
ξ(oip, osn, kno, val, hops+1, sip, ∅) as new entry.
The routing table does not change between Lines 4
and 36; nor do the values of hops, oip and osn.
Writing Nk for a network expression in which the local
node ip is about to execute Line k, this passage can be
reworded as
Hence . . . ipc := ξ
ip
N36
(ip) = ip and ξipcN36 = ξ
ip
N36
(by
(3)). ξipN5(rt) :=
ξipN4(update(rt,(oip,osn,kno,val,hops+1,sip,∅)))
:= update(ξipN4(rt) , (ξ
ip
N4
(oip) , ξipN4(osn) , . . .)).
ξipN5(rt) = ξ
ip
N36
(rt) ∧ ξipN4(hops) = ξ
ip
N36
(hops)∧
ξipN4(oip) = ξ
ip
N36
(oip)∧ ξipN4(osn) = ξ
ip
N36
(osn).
In all of case Pro. 4, Line 36, through the statement
of the proposition, N is bound to N36, so that ξ
ip
N =
ξipN36 .
In Section 4.4 we have defined functions that work
on evaluated routing tables ξipN (rt), such as nhop. To
ease readability, we abbreviate nhop(ξipN (rt) ,dip) by
nhop
ip
N (dip). Similarly, we use sqn
ip
N (dip), dhops
ip
N (dip),
flag
ip
N (dip), σroute
ip
N (dip), kD
ip
N , vD
ip
N and iD
ip
N for
sqn(ξipN (rt),dip), dhops(ξ
ip
N (rt),dip), flag(ξ
ip
N (rt),dip),
σroute(ξ
ip
N (rt) , ip), kD(ξ
ip
N (rt)), vD(ξ
ip
N (rt)) and
iD(ξipN (rt)), respectively.
6.3 Basic Properties
In this section we show some of the most fundamental
invariants for AODV. The first one is already stated in
the RFC [39, Sect. 3].
Proposition 2 Any sequence number of a given node
ip increases monotonically, i.e., never decreases, and is
never unknown. That is, for ip ∈ IP, if N ℓ−→ N ′ then
1 ≤ ξipN (sn) ≤ ξ
ip
N ′(sn).
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Proof In all initial states the invariant is satisfied, as
all sequence numbers of all nodes are set to 1 (see (2)
in Section 5.7). The Processes 1–7 of Section 5 change
a node’s sequence number only through the functions
inc and max. This occurs at two places only:
Pro. 1, Line 35: Here ξipN (sn)≤inc(ξ
ip
N (sn))=ξ
ip
N ′(sn).
Pro. 4, Line 8: Here ξipN (sn)≤max(ξ
ip
N (sn),∗)=ξ
ip
N ′(sn).
From this and the fact that all sequence numbers are
initialised with 1 we get 1 ≤ ξipN (sn). ⊓⊔
The proof strategy used above can be generalised.
Remark 3 Most of the forthcoming proofs can be done
by showing the statement for each initial state and then
checking all locations in the processes where the validity
of the invariant is possibly changed. Note that routing
table entries are only changed by the functions update,
invalidate or addpreRT. Thus we have to show that
an invariant dealing with routing tables is satisfied after
the execution of these functions if it was valid before. In
our proofs, we go through all occurrences of these func-
tions. In case the invariant does not make statements
about precursors, the function addpreRT need not be
considered.
To ease readability we defer most of the proofs to the
appendix; and show only the most important ones in
the main text.
Proposition 4 The set of known destinations of any
node increases monotonically. That is, for ip ∈ IP, if
N
ℓ−→ N ′ then kDipN ⊆ kD
ip
N ′ .
Proposition 5 In each node’s routing table, the se-
quence number for a given destination increases mono-
tonically, i.e., never decreases. That is, for ip, dip ∈ IP,
if N
ℓ−→ N ′ then sqnipN (dip) ≤ sqn
ip
N ′(dip).
Our next invariant tells that each node is correctly
informed about its own identity.
Proposition 6 For each ip ∈ IP and each reachable
state N we have ξipN (ip) = ip.
This proposition will be used implicitly in many of the
proofs to follow. In particular, for all ip′, ip′′ ∈ IP
ξip
′
N (ip) = ip
′′ ⇒ ip′ = ip′′ ∧ ξip
′
N = ξ
ip′′
N . (3)
Next, we show that every AODV control message
contains the IP address of the sender.
Proposition 7 If an AODV control message is sent by
node ip ∈ IP, the node sending this message identifies
itself correctly: N R:*cast(m)−−−−−−−→ip N ′ ⇒ ip = ipc, where
the message m is either rreq(∗ , ∗ , ∗ , ∗ , ∗ , ∗ , ∗ , ipc),
rrep(∗ ,∗ ,∗ ,∗ , ipc), or rerr(∗ , ipc).
The proof is straightforward: whenever such a message
is sent in one of the processes of Section 5, ξ(ip) is set
as the last argument. ⊓⊔
Proposition 8 All routing table entries have a hop
count greater than or equal to 1.
(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, hops, ∗, ∗) ∈ ξipN (rt)⇒ hops ≥ 1 (4)
Proposition 9
(a) If a route request with hop count 0 is sent by a node
ipc ∈ IP, the sender must be the originator.
N R:*cast(rreq(0,∗,∗,∗,∗,oipc,∗,ipc))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ip N
′ ⇒ oipc=ipc (5)
(b) If a route reply with hop count 0 is sent by a node
ipc ∈ IP, the sender must be the destination.
N R:*cast(rrep(0,dipc,∗,∗,ipc))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ip N
′ ⇒ dipc = ipc (6)
Proposition 10
(a) Each routing table entry with 0 as its destination
sequence number has a sequence-number-status flag
valued unknown.
(dip, 0, f, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗) ∈ ξipN (rt)⇒ f = unk (7)
(b) Unknown sequence numbers can only occur at 1-
hop connections.
(∗, ∗, unk, ∗, hops, ∗, ∗) ∈ ξipN (rt)⇒ hops = 1 (8)
(c) 1-hop connections must contain the destination as
next hop.
(dip, ∗, ∗, ∗, 1, nhip, ∗) ∈ ξipN (rt)⇒ dip = nhip (9)
(d) If the sequence number 0 occurs within a routing
table entry, the hop count as well as the next hop
can be determined.
(dip, 0, f, ∗, hops, nhip, ∗) ∈ ξipN (rt)
⇒ f = unk ∧ hops = 1 ∧ dip = nhip
(10)
Proposition 11
(a) Whenever an originator sequence number is sent as
part of a route request message, it is known, i.e., it
is greater than or equal to 1.
N
R:*cast(rreq(∗,∗,∗,∗,∗,∗,osnc,∗))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ip N
′ ⇒ osnc ≥ 1 (11)
(b) Whenever a destination sequence number is sent as
part of a route reply message, it is known, i.e., it is
greater than or equal to 1.
N R:*cast(rrep(∗,∗,dsnc,∗,∗))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ip N
′ ⇒ dsnc ≥ 1 (12)
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Proposition 12
(a) If a route request is sent (forwarded) by a node ipc
different from the originator of the request then the
content of ipc’s routing table must be fresher or at
least as good as the information inside the message.
N
R:*cast(rreq(hopsc,∗,∗,∗,∗,oipc,osnc,ipc))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ip N
′
∧ ipc 6= oipc
⇒ oipc ∈ kD
ipc
N ∧
(
sqn
ipc
N (oipc) > osnc
∨ (sqnipcN (oipc) = osnc ∧ dhops
ipc
N (oipc) ≤ hopsc
∧ flagipcN (oipc) = val)
)
(13)
(b) If a route reply is sent by a node ipc, different from
the destination of the route, then the content of
ipc’s routing table must be consistent with the in-
formation inside the message.
N R:*cast(rrep(hopsc,dipc,dsnc,∗,ipc))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ip N ′
∧ ipc 6= dipc
⇒ dipc ∈ kD
ipc
N ∧ sqn
ipc
N (dipc) = dsnc
∧ dhopsipcN (dipc) = hopsc ∧ flag
ipc
N (dipc) = val
(14)
Proposition 13 Any sequence number appearing in a
route error message stems from an invalid destination
and is equal to the sequence number for that destination
in the sender’s routing table at the time of sending.
N R:*cast(rerr(destsc,ipc))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ip N ′
∧ (ripc, rsnc) ∈ destsc
⇒ ripc ∈ iD
ip
N ∧ rsnc = sqn
ip
N (ripc)
(15)
6.4 Well-Definedness
We have to ensure that our specification of AODV is
actually well defined. Since many functions introduced
in Section 4 are only partial, it has to be checked that
these functions are either defined when they are used,
or are subterms of atomic formulas. In the latter case,
those formula would evaluate to false (cf. Footnote 8).
The first proposition shows that the functions de-
fined in Section 4 respect the data structure. In fact,
these properties are required (or implied) by our data
structure.
Proposition 14
(a) In each routing table there is at most one entry for
each destination.
(b) In each store of queued data packets there is at
most one data queue for each destination.
(c) Whenever a set of pairs (rip, rsn) is assigned to the
variable dests of type IP ⇀ SQN, or to the first
argument of the function rerr, this set is a partial
function, i.e., there is at most one entry (rip, rsn)
for each destination rip.
Property (a) is stated in the RFC [39].
Next, we show that a function is used in the specifi-
cation of AODV only when it is defined, with nhop and
σp-flag as possible exceptions. In this paper, we only
give the proof for update; for the remaining functions
σroute, flag, dhops, precs, addpreRT, head, tail and
drop the proofs are straightforward, inspecting the lo-
cations of function calls; detailed proofs can be found
in [16, Section 7.4].
Proposition 15 In our specification of AODV, the
function update is used only when it is defined.
The functions nhop and σp-flag need a closer inspection.
Proposition 16 In our specification of AODV, the
function nhop is either used within formulas or if it
is defined; hence it is only used in a meaningful way.
If one chooses to use lazy evaluation for conjunction,
then nhop is only used where it is defined. Lastly, the
function σp-flag is called only in Pro. 1 in Line 33, within
a formula. Again, if one uses lazy evaluation for con-
junction, then σp-flag is used only where it is defined.
6.5 The Quality of Routing Table Entries
In this section we define a total preorder⊑dip on routing
table entries for a given destination dip. Entries are
ordered by the quality of the information they provide.
This order will be defined in such a way that (a) the
quality of a node’s routing table entry for dip will only
increase over time, and (b) the quality of valid routing
table entries along a route to dip strictly increases every
hop (at least prior to reaching dip). This order allows
us to prove loop freedom of AODV in the next section.
A main ingredient in the definition of the quality
preorder is the sequence number of a routing table en-
try. A higher sequence number denotes fresher infor-
mation. However, it generally is not the case that along
a route to dip found by AODV the sequence numbers
are only increasing. This is since AODV increases the
sequence number of an entry at an intermediate node
when invalidating it. To “compensate” for that we in-
troduce the concept of a net sequence number. It is de-
fined by a function nsqn : R→ SQN
nsqn(r) :=
{
π2(r) if π4(r) = val ∨ π2(r) = 0
π2(r)− 1 otherwise .
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For n ∈ IN define n •−1 := max(n−1, 0); hence inc(n) •−1
= n. Then nsqn(r) = π2(r)
•− 1 if π4(r) = inv.
To model increase in quality, we define ⊑dip by first
comparing the net sequence numbers of two entries—a
larger net sequence number denotes fresher and higher
quality information. In case the net sequence numbers
are equal, we decide on their hop counts—the entry
with the least hop count is the best. This yields the
following lexicographical order:
Assume two routing table entries r, r′ ∈ R with π1(r)
= π1(r
′) = dip. Then
r ⊑dip r′ :⇔ nsqn(r) < nsqn(r′)
∨ (nsqn(r) = nsqn(r′) ∧ π5(r) ≥ π5(r′)) .
To reason about AODV, net sequence numbers and
the quality preorder are lifted to routing tables. As for
sqn we define a total function to determine net sequence
numbers.
nsqn : RT× IP→ SQN
nsqn(rt ,dip) :=


nsqn(σroute(rt ,dip))
if σroute(rt ,dip) is defined
0 otherwise .
: =


sqn(rt ,dip)
if flag(rt ,dip) = val
sqn(rt ,dip) •− 1 otherwise .
If two routing tables rt and rt′ have a routing table
entry to dip, i.e., dip ∈ kD(rt) ∩ kD(rt′), the preorder
can be lifted as well.
rt ⊑dip rt′ :⇔ σroute(rt ,dip) ⊑dip σroute(rt
′ ,dip)
⇔ nsqn(rt ,dip) < nsqn(rt′ ,dip)∨(
nsqn(rt ,dip) = nsqn(rt′ ,dip)
∧ dhops(rt ,dip) ≥ dhops(rt′ ,dip)
)
For all destinations dip ∈ IP, the relation ⊑dip on rout-
ing tables with an entry for dip is total preorder. The
equivalence relation induced by⊑dip is denoted by≈dip.
As with sqn, we abbreviate nsqn: nsqnipN(dip) :=
nsqn(ξipN (rt) ,dip). Note that
sqn
ip
N (dip)
•− 1 ≤ nsqnipN (dip) ≤ sqn
ip
N (dip) . (16)
After setting up this notion of quality, we now show
that routing tables, when modified by AODV, never
decrease their quality.
Proposition 17 Assume a routing table rt ∈ RT with
dip ∈ kD(rt).
(a) An update of rt can only increase the quality of
the routing table. That is, for all routes r such that
update(rt , r) is defined (π4(r) = val, π2(r) = 0 ⇔
π3(r) = unk and π3(r) = unk⇒ π5(r) = 1) we have
rt ⊑dip update(rt , r) . (17)
(b) An invalidate on rt does not change the quality
of the routing table if, for each (rip, rsn) ∈ dests, rt
has a valid entry for rip, and
– rsn is the by one incremented sequence number
from the routing table, or
– both rsn and the sequence number in the rout-
ing table are 0.
That is, for all partial functions dests (subsets of
IP× SQN)(
(rip, rsn) ∈ dests⇒ rip ∈ vD(rt)
∧ rsn = inc(sqn(rt , rip))
)
⇒ rt ≈dip invalidate(rt ,dests) .
(18)
(c) If precursors are added to an entry of rt, the quality
of the routing table does not change. That is, for
all dip ∈ IP and sets of precursors npre ∈ P(IP),
rt ≈dip addpreRT(rt ,dip ,npre) . (19)
We can apply this result to obtain the following theo-
rem.
Theorem 18 In AODV, the quality of routing tables
can only be increased, never decreased. Assume N
ℓ−→
N ′ and ip, dip ∈ IP. If dip ∈ kDipN , then dip ∈ kD
ip
N ′ and
ξipN (rt) ⊑dip ξ
ip
N ′(rt).
Proof If dip ∈ kDipN , then dip ∈ kD
ip
N ′ follows by Proposi-
tion 4. To show ξipN (rt) ⊑dip ξ
ip
N ′(rt), by Remark 3 and
Proposition 17(a) and (c) it suffices to check all calls of
invalidate.
Pro. 1, Line 28; Pro. 3, Line 10; Pro. 4, Lines 13, 29;
Pro. 5, Line 17: By construction of dests (imme-
diately before the invalidation call)
(rip, rsn) ∈ ξipN (dests)
⇒ rip ∈ vD(ξipN (rt)) ∧ rsn = inc(sqn(ξ
ip
N (rt) ,rip))
and hence, by Proposition 17(b), ξipN (rt) ≈dip
invalidate(ξipN (rt) , ξ
ip
N (dests)) = ξ
ip
N ′(rt).
Pro. 6, Line 3: Assume that invalidate modifies an
entry having the form (rip, dsn, ∗,flag, ∗, ∗, ∗). Let
(rip, rsn) ∈ dests; then the update results in the en-
try (rip, rsn, ∗, inv, ∗, ∗, ∗). Moreover, by Line 2 of
Pro. 6, flag=val. By definition of net sequence num-
bers,
nsqn(ξipN (rt) ,rip) = sqn(ξ
ip
N (rt) ,rip)
≤ rsn •− 1 = nsqn(ξipN ′(rt) , rip) .
The second step holds, since sqn(ξipN2(rt),rip) < rsn,
using Line 2. Since the hop count is not changed
by invalidate, we also have dhops(ξipN (rt) , rip) =
dhops(ξipN ′(rt),rip), and hence ξ
ip
N (rt) ⊑dip ξ
ip
N ′(rt).
⊓⊔
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Theorem 18 states in particular that if N ℓ−→ N ′ then
nsqn
ip
N (dip) ≤ nsqn
ip
N ′(dip).
Proposition 19 If, in a reachable network expression
N , a node ip∈ IP has a routing table entry to dip, then
also the next hop nhip towards dip, if not dip itself,
has a routing table entry to dip, and the net sequence
number of the latter entry is at least as large as that of
the former.
dip ∈ kDipN ∧ nhip 6= dip
⇒ dip ∈ kDnhipN ∧ nsqn
ip
N (dip) ≤ nsqn
nhip
N (dip) ,
(20)
where nhip := nhopipN (dip) is the IP address of the next
hop.
To prove loop freedom we will show that on any route
established by AODV the quality of routing tables in-
creases when going from one node to the next hop.
Here, the preorder is not sufficient, since we need a
strict increase in quality. Therefore, on routing tables
rt and rt′ that both have an entry to dip, i.e., dip ∈
kD(rt) ∩ kD(rt′), we define a relation ⊏dip by
rt ⊏dip rt
′ :⇔ rt ⊑dip rt
′ ∧ rt 6≈dip rt
′ .
Corollary 20 The relation ⊏dip is irreflexive and
transitive.
Theorem 21 The quality of the routing table entries
for a destination dip is strictly increasing along a route
towards dip, until it reaches either dip or a node with
an invalid routing table entry to dip.
dip ∈ vDipN ∩ vD
nhip
N ∧ nhip 6= dip
⇒ ξipN (rt) ⊏dip ξ
nhip
N (rt) ,
(21)
where N is a reachable network expression and nhip :=
nhop
ip
N (dip) is the IP address of the next hop.
Proof As before, we first check the initial states of our
transition system and then check all locations in Pro-
cesses 1–7 where a routing table might be changed.
For an initial network expression, the invariant holds
since all routing tables are empty. Adding precursors to
ξipN (rt) or ξ
nhip
N (rt) does not affect the invariant, since
the invariant does not depend on precursors, so it suf-
fices to examine all modifications to ξipN (rt) or ξ
nhip
N (rt)
using update or invalidate. Moreover, without loss of
generality we restrict attention to those applications of
update or invalidate that actually modify the entry
for dip, beyond its precursors; if update only adds some
precursors in the routing table, the invariant—which is
assumed to hold before—is maintained.
Applications of invalidate to ξipN (rt) or ξ
nhip
N (rt)
lead to a network state in which the antecedent of (21)
is not satisfied. Now consider an application of update
to ξnhipN (rt). We restrict attention to the case that the
antecedent of (21) is satisfied right after the update,
so that right before the update we have dip ∈ vDipN ∧
nhip 6= dip. In the special case that sqnnhipN (dip) = 0
right before the update, we have nsqnnhipN (dip) = 0 and
thus nsqnipN (dip) = 0 by Invariant (20). Considering
that flagipN (dip) = val, this implies sqn
ip
N (dip) = 0. By
Proposition 10(d) we have nhip = dip, contradicting
our assumptions. It follows that right before the update
sqn
nhip
N (dip) > 0; so in particular dip ∈ kD
nhip
N .
An application of update to ξnhipN (rt) that changes
flag
nhip
N (dip) from inv to val cannot decrease the se-
quence number of the entry to dip and hence strictly in-
creases its net sequence number. Before the update we
had nsqnipN (dip) ≤ nsqn
nhip
N (dip) by Invariant (20), so
afterwards we must have nsqnipN (dip) < nsqn
nhip
N (dip),
and therefore ξipN (rt) ⊏dip ξ
nhip
N (rt). An update to
ξnhipN (rt) that maintains flag
nhip
N (dip) = val can only
increase the quality of the entry to dip (cf. Theorem 18),
and hence maintains Invariant (21).
It remains to examine the updates to ξipN (rt).
Pro. 1, Lines 10, 14, 18: The entry ξ(sip ,0 ,unk ,val ,
1 , sip , ∅) is used for the update; its destination is
dip := ξ(sip). Since dip = nhopipN (dip) = nhip, the
antecedent of the invariant to be proven is not sat-
isfied.
Pro. 4, Line 4: We assume that the entry ξ(oip, osn,
kno, val, hops+ 1, sip, ∗) is inserted into ξ(rt). So
dip := ξ(oip), nhip := ξ(sip), nsqnipN (dip) := ξ(osn)
and dhopsipN (dip) := ξ(hops) + 1. This information
is distilled from a received route request message
(cf. Lines 1 and 8 of Pro. 1). By Proposition 1 this
message was sent before, say in state N †; by Pro-
position 7 the sender of this message is ξ(sip).
By Invariant (13), with ipc := ξ(sip)=nhip, oipc :=
ξ(oip) = dip, osnc :=ξ(osn) and hopsc :=ξ(hops),
and using that ipc = nhip 6= dip = oipc, we get that
sqn
nhip
N†
(dip) = sqnipc
N†
(oipc) > osnc = ξ(osn) , or
sqn
nhip
N†
(dip) = ξ(osn) ∧ dhopsnhip
N†
(dip) ≤ ξ(hops)
∧ flagnhip
N†
(dip) = val .
We first assume that the first line holds. Then, by
the assumption dip ∈ vD(ξnhipN (rt)), the definition
of net sequence numbers, and Proposition 5,
nsqn
nhip
N (dip) = sqn
nhip
N (dip) ≥ sqn
nhip
N†
(dip)
> ξ(osn) = nsqnipN (dip) .
and hence ξipN (rt) ⊏dip ξ
nhip
N (rt).
We now assume the second line to be valid. From
this we conclude
nsqn
nhip
N†
(dip) = sqnnhip
N†
(dip) = ξ(osn)
= nsqnipN(dip) .
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Moreover, dhopsnhip
N†
(dip) ≤ ξ(hops) < ξ(hops) +
1 = dhopsipN (dip). Hence ξ
ip
N (rt) ⊏dip ξ
nhip
N†
(rt). To-
gether with Theorem 18 and the transitivity of ⊑dip
this yields ξipN (rt) ⊏dip ξ
nhip
N (rt).
Pro. 5, Line 2: This update is similar to the one of
Pro. 4, Line 4. The only difference is that the in-
formation stems from an incoming RREP message
and that a routing table entry to ξ(dip) (instead of
ξ(oip)) is established. Therefore, the proof is similar
to the one of Pro. 4, Line 4; instead of Invariant (13)
we use Invariant (14). ⊓⊔
6.6 Loop Freedom
The “na¨ıve” notion of loop freedom is a term that infor-
mally means that “a packet never goes round in cycles
without (at some point) being delivered”. This dynamic
definition is not only hard to formalise, it is also too
restrictive a requirement for AODV. There are situa-
tions where packets are sent in cycles, but which are not
considered harmful. This can happen when the topol-
ogy keeps changing. We refer to [16, Sect. 7.6] for an
example.
Due to this dynamic behaviour, the sense of loop
freedom is much better captured by a static invariant,
saying that at any given time the collective routing
tables of the nodes do not admit a loop. Such a re-
quirement does not rule out the dynamic loop alluded
to above. However, in situations where the topology
remains stable sufficiently long it does guarantee that
packets will not keep going around in cycles.
To this end we define the routing graph of a net-
work expression N with respect to destination dip by
RN (dip) :=(IP, E), where all nodes of the network form
the set of vertices and there is an arc (ip, ip′) ∈ E iff
ip 6= dip and (dip ,∗ ,∗ ,val ,∗ , ip′ ,∗)∈ ξipN (rt).
An arc in a routing graph states that ip′ is the next
hop on a valid route to dip known by ip; a path in a
routing graph describes a route towards dip discovered
by AODV. We say that a network expression N is loop
free if the corresponding routing graphs RN (dip) are
loop free, for all dip∈ IP. A routing protocol, such as
AODV, is loop free iff all reachable network expressions
are loop free.
Using this definition of a routing graph, Theorem 21
states that along a path towards a destination dip in
the routing graph of a reachable network expression N ,
until it reaches either dip or a node with an invalided
routing table entry to dip, the quality of the routing
table entries for dip is strictly increasing. From this, we
can immediately conclude
Theorem 22 The specification of AODV given in Sec-
tion 5 is loop free.
Proof If there were a loop in a routing graph RN (dip),
then for any edge (ip, nhip) on that loop one has, by
Theorem 21, ξipN (rt) ⊏dip ξ
nhip
N (rt). Thus, by transitiv-
ity of ⊏dip, one has ξ
ip
N (rt) ⊏dip ξ
ip
N (rt), which contra-
dicts the irreflexivity of ⊏dip (cf. Corollary 20). ⊓⊔
According to Theorem 22 any route to a destination
dip established by AODV—i.e. a path in RN (dip)—
ends after finitely many hops. There are three possible
ways in which it could end:
(1) by reaching the destination,
(2) by reaching a node with an invalid entry to dip, or
(3) by reaching a node without any entry to dip.
(1) is what AODV attempts to accomplish, whereas
(2) is an unavoidable due to link breaks in a dynamic
topology. It follows directly from Proposition 19 that
(3) can never occur.
6.7 Route Correctness
The creation of a routing table entry at node ip for des-
tination dip is no guarantee that a route from ip to dip
actually exists. The entry is created based on informa-
tion gathered from messages received in the past, and
at any time link breaks may occur. The best one could
require of a protocol like AODV is that routing table
entries are based on information that was valid at some
point in the past. This is the essence of what we call
route correctness.
We define a history of an AODV-like protocol as
a sequence H = N0N1 . . . Nk of network expressions,
where N0 is an initial state of the protocol, and for
1 ≤ i ≤ k there is a transition Ni−1
ℓ−→ Ni; we call H a
history of the state Nk. The connectivity graph of a his-
tory H is CH :=(IP, E), where the nodes of the network
form the set of vertices and there is an arc (ip, ip′) ∈ E
iff ip′ ∈ RipNi for some 0 ≤ i ≤ k, i.e. if at some point
during that history node ip′ was in transmission range
of ip. A protocol satisfies the property route correctness
if for every history H of a reachable state N and for ev-
ery routing table entry (dip,∗,∗,∗,hops,nhip,∗)∈ ξipN (rt)
there is a path ip→ nhip→ · · · → dip in CH from ip to
dip with hops hops and (if hops > 0) next hop nhip.24
Theorem 23 Let H be a history of a network state N .
(a) For each entry (dip, ∗, ∗, ∗, hops, nhip, ∗)∈ ξipN (rt)
there is a path ip → nhip → · · · → dip in CH from
ip to dip with hops hops and (if hops > 0) next hop
nhip.
24 A path with 0 hops consists of a single node only.
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(b) For each route request sent in state N there is a
corresponding path in the connectivity graph of H .
N
R:*cast(rreq(hopsc,∗,∗,∗,∗,oipc,∗,ipc))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ip N
′
⇒ there is a path ipc → · · · → oipc in CH
from ipc to oipc with hopsc hops
(22)
(c) For each route reply sent in state N there is a cor-
responding path in the connectivity graph of H .
N R:*cast(rrep(hopsc,dipc,∗,∗,ipc))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ip N ′
⇒ there is a path ipc → · · · → dipc in CH
from ipc to dipc with hopsc hops
(23)
Theorem 23(a) says that the AODV protocol is route
correct. For the proof it is essential that we use the
version of AWN where a node ip′ is in the range of
node ip, meaning that ip′ can receive messages sent by
ip, if and only if ip is in the range of ip′. If AWN is
modified so as to allow asymmetric connectivity graphs,
as contemplated in [15,16], it is trivial to construct a
2-node counterexample to route correctness.
A stronger concept of route correctness could re-
quire that for every history H of a state N and for each
(dip, ∗, ∗, ∗, hops, nhip, ∗)∈ ξipN (rt)
– either hops = 0 and dip = ip,
– or hops = 1 and dip = nhip and there is a N † in H
such that nhip ∈Rip
N†
,
– or hops> 1 and there is a N † in H with nhip ∈Rip
N†
and (dip, ∗, ∗, val, hops−1, ∗, ∗) ∈ ξnhip
N†
(rt).
It turns out that this stronger form of route correctness
does not hold for AODV. It can be violated when a
node forwards a route request without updating its own
(fresher) routing table entry for the originator of the
route request.
7 Related Work
Several process algebras modelling broadcast commu-
nication have been proposed before: the Calculus of
Broadcasting Systems (CBS) [45], the bπ-calculus [13],
CBS#[36], the Calculus of Wireless Systems (CWS)[33],
the Calculus of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (CMAN) [21],
the Calculus for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (CMN) [32],
the ω-calculus [49], restricted branching process theory
(RBPT) [19], bAπ [22] and the broadcast psi-calculi [5].
The latter eight of these were specifically designed
to model MANETs. However, none of these process cal-
culi provides all features needed to fully model routing
protocols such as AODV, namely data handling, (condi-
tional) unicast and (local) broadcast. For example, all
above-mentioned process algebras lack the feature of
guaranteed receipt of messages by destinations within
transmission range. Due to this, it is not possible to
analyse properties such as route discovery and packet
delivery [16]. A more detailed discussion of these pro-
cess algebras can be found in [16].
Our complete formalisation of AODV has grown
from elaborating a partial and simplified formalisation
of AODV in [49, Fig. 8]. The features of our process
algebra were largely determined by what we needed to
enable a complete and accurate formalisation of this
protocol. The same formalism has been used to model
the Dynamic MANET On-demand (DYMO) Routing
Protocol (also known as AODVv2) [12]. We conjecture
that AWN is also applicable to a wide range of other
wireless protocols, such as the Dynamic Source Rout-
ing (DSR) protocol [29], the Lightweight Underlay Net-
work Ad-hoc Routing (LUNAR) protocol [51,52], the
Optimized Link State Routing (OSLR) protocol [10]
or the Better Approach To Mobile Adhoc Networking
(B.A.T.M.A.N.) [37]. The specification and the correct-
ness of the latter three, however, rely heavily on timing
aspects; hence an AWN-extension with time [8] appears
necessary (see also Section 8).
While process algebras such as AWN can be used
to formally model and verify the correctness of network
routing protocols, test-bed experiments and simulations
are complementary tools that can be used to quantita-
tively evaluate the performance of the protocols. While
test-bed experiments are able to capture the full com-
plex characteristics of the wireless medium and its effect
on the network routing protocols [30,44], network sim-
ulators [38,48] offer the ease and flexibility of evaluat-
ing and comparing the performance of different routing
protocols in a large-scale network of hundreds of nodes,
coupled with the added advantage of being able to re-
peat and reproduce the experiments [11,40,28].
Loop freedom is a crucial property of network proto-
cols, commonly claimed to hold for AODV [39]. Merlin
and Segall [31] were amongst the first to use sequence
numbers to guarantee loop freedom of a routing pro-
tocol. In a companion paper [20] we have shown that
several interpretations of AODV—consistent ways to
revolve the ambiguities in the RFC—fail to be loop
free, while in [16] we establish loop freedom of others
by adaptation of the proof presented here.
A preliminary draft of AODV has been shown to be
not loop free by Bhargavan et al. in [3]. Their coun-
terexamples to loop freedom have to do with timing
issues: the premature deletion of invalid routes, and a
too quick restart of a node after a reboot. Since then,
AODV has changed to such a degree that these exam-
ples do not apply to the current version [39]. However,
similar examples, claimed to apply to the current ver-
sion, are reported in [18,47]; we discuss them in [8].
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All these papers propose repairs that avoid these loops
through better timing policies. In contrast, the routing
loops documented in [20] are time-independent.
Previous attempts to prove loop freedom of AODV
have been reported in [42,3,55], but none of these proofs
are complete and valid for the current version of AODV
[39]:
– The proof sketch given in [42] uses the fact that
when a loop in a route to a destination Z is cre-
ated, all nodes Xi on that loop must have route
entries for destination Z with the same destination
sequence number. “Furthermore, because the desti-
nation sequence numbers are all the same, the next
hop information must have been derived at every
node Xi from the same RREP transmitted by the
destination Z” [42, Page 11]. The latter is not true
at all: some of the information could have been de-
rived from RREQ messages, or from a RREP mes-
sage transmitted by an intermediate node that has
a route to Z. More importantly, the nodes on the
loop may have acquired their information on a route
to Z from different RREP or RREQ messages, that
all carried the same sequence number. This is illus-
trated by the routing loop created in [20, Figure 1].
– Based on an analysis of an early draft of AODV25 [3]
suggests three improvements. The modified version
is then proved to be loop free, using the following
invariant (written in our notation):
if nhip = nhopipN (dip), then
(1) sqnipN (dip) ≤ sqn
nhip
N (dip), and
(2) sqnipN (dip) = sqn
nhip
N (dip)
⇒ dhopsipN (dip) < dhops
nhip
N (dip) .
This invariant does not hold for this modified ver-
sion of AODV, nor for the current version, docu-
mented in the RFC. It can happen that in a state
N where sqnipN (dip) = sqn
nhip
N (dip), node ip notices
that the link to nhip is broken. Consequently, ip in-
validates its route to dip, which has nhip as its next
hop. According to recommendation (A1) of [3, Page
561]), node ip increments its sequence number for
the (invalid) route to dip, resulting in a state N ′ for
which sqnipN ′(dip) > sqn
nhip
N ′ (dip), thereby violating
the invariant.
Note that the invariant of [3] does not restrict itself
to the case that the routing table entry for dip main-
tained by ip is valid. Adapting the invariant with
such a requirement would give rise to a valid invari-
ant, but one whose verification poses problems, at
25 Draft version 2 is analysed, dated November 1998; the
RFC can be seen as version 14, dated July 2001.
least for the current version of AODV. These prob-
lems led us, in this paper, to use net sequence num-
bers instead (cf. Section 6.5).
Recommendation (A1) is assumed to be in effect
for the (improved) version of AODV analysed in [3],
although it was not in effect for the draft of AODV
existing at the time. Since then, recommendation
(A1) has been incorporated in the RFC. Looking
at the proofs in [3], it turns out that Lemma 20(1)
of [3] is invalid. This failure is surprising, given that
according to [3] Lemma 20 is automatically verified
by SPIN. A possible explanation might be that this
lemma is obviously valid for the version of AODV
prior to the recommendations of [3].
– Zhou, Yang, Zhang, and Wang [55] establish loop
freedom of AODV using an adaptation of the in-
variant from [3] with a validity requirement. How-
ever, they do not model route replies by intermedi-
ate nodes. This is a core feature of AODV, and a
potential source of routing loops [20].
8 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented a complete and ac-
curate model of the core functionality of the Ad hoc
On-Demand Distance Vector routing protocol, a widely
used protocol of practical relevance, using the process
algebra AWN. We currently do not model optional fea-
tures such as local route repair, expanding ring search,
gratuitous route reply and multicast. We also abstract
from all timing issues. In addition to modelling the com-
plete set of core functionalities of the AODV protocol,
our model also covers the interface to higher protocol
layers via the injection and delivery of application layer
data, as well as the forwarding of data packets at inter-
mediate nodes. Although this is not part of the AODV
protocol specification, it is necessary for a practical
model of any reactive routing protocol, where protocol
activity is triggered via the sending and forwarding of
data packets. The completeness of our model is in con-
trast to some prior related work, which either modelled
only very simple protocols, or modelled only a subset of
the functionality of relevant WMN or MANET routing
protocols.
The used modelling language AWN is tailored for
WMNs and MANETs and hence covers major aspects
of WMN routing protocols, for example the crucial as-
pect of data handling, such as maintaining routing ta-
ble information. AWN allows not only the creation of
accurate and concise models of relatively complex and
practically relevant protocols, but also supports read-
ability.
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The currently predominant practice of informally
specifying WMN and MANET protocols via English
prose has a potential for ambiguity and inconsistent
interpretation. The ability to provide a formal and un-
ambiguous specification of such protocols via AWN is
a significant benefit in its own right. Through a care-
ful analysis of AODV, in particular with respect to
the loop-freedom property, we have demonstrated how
AWN can be used as a basis for reasoning about critical
protocol correctness properties. By establishing invari-
ants that remain valid in a network running AODV, we
have shown that our model is loop free. In contrast to
protocol evaluation using simulation, test-bed experi-
ments or model checking, where only a finite number of
specific network scenarios can be considered, our rea-
soning with AWN is generic and the proofs hold for
any possible network scenario in terms of topology and
traffic pattern. None of the experimental protocol eval-
uation approaches can deliver this high degree of as-
surance about protocol behaviour. As a “side product”
we have also shown that, in contrast to common belief,
sequence numbers do not guarantee loop freedom, even
if they are increased monotonically over time and in-
cremented whenever a new route request is generated;
this result is presented elsewhere [20].
During creation of our model of AODV we uncov-
ered several ambiguities in the AODV RFC [39]. In [16]
we have analysed all interpretations of the RFC that
stem from the ambiguities revealed. It turned out that
several interpretations can yield unwanted behaviour
such as routing loops. We also found that implementa-
tions of AODV behave differently in crucial aspects of
protocol behaviour, although they all follow the lines
of the RFC. Of course a specification “needs to be rea-
sonably implementation independent”26 and can leave
some decisions to the software engineer; however it is
our belief that any specification should be clear and
unambiguous enough to guarantee the same behaviour
when given to different developers. As demonstrated,
this is not the case for AODV, and likely not for many
other RFCs provided by the IETF.
To increase the level of confidence of our analysis
even further, we mechanised AWN as well as the pre-
sented pen-and-paper proof of loop freedom of AODV
in the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. [7,6]
When verifying our (pen-and-paper) proof we did not
find any major errors: (1) type checking found a minor
typo in the model, (2) one proof invoked an incorrect
invariant requiring the addition and proof of a new in-
variant based on an existing one, (3) a minor flaw in
another proof required the addition of a new invari-
26 http://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/
pseudocode-guidelines.html
ant. All these “flaws” have been repaired in the present
proof.
There are two directions of future work with regards
to AODV: (a) A further analysis of AODV will require
an extension of AWN with time and probability: the for-
mer to cover aspects such as AODV’s handling (dele-
tion) of stale routing table entries and the latter to
model the probability associated with lossy links. The
loop freedom result presented here is based on a model
in which routing table entries never expire. Hence it
does not rule out AODV routing loops due to premature
deletion of routing table entries. We expect that the re-
sulting algebra will be also applicable to a wide range of
other wireless protocols. (b) Since AODV was designed
without security features in mind, it is vulnerable to
malicious attacks such as routing attacks and forward-
ing attacks [53]. It may be worthwhile to formally prove
that extensions of AODV such as SAODV [24] actually
protect the route discovery mechanism by providing se-
curity features like integrity and authentication.
Next to this on-going work, we also aim to comple-
ment AWN by model checking.27 Having the ability of
automatically deriving a model for model checkers such
as Uppaal from an AWN specification allows the con-
firmation and detailed diagnostics of suspected errors in
an early phase of protocol development. Model check-
ing is limited to networks of small size—due to state
space explosion— whereas our analysis covers all (static
and dynamic) topologies. However, finding shortcom-
ings in some topologies is useful to identify problem-
atic behaviour. These shortcomings can be eliminated,
even before a more thorough and general analysis using
AWN.
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A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4 None of the functions used to change
routing tables removes an entry altogether. ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 5 The only function that can decrease a
destination sequence number is invalidate. When invalidat-
ing routing table entries using the function invalidate(rt ,
dests), sequence numbers are copied from dests to the cor-
responding entry in rt. It is sufficient to show that for all
(rip, rsn) ∈ ξip
N
(dests) we have sqnip
N
(rip) ≤ rsn, as all other
sequence numbers in routing table entries remain unchanged.
Pro. 1, Line 28; Pro. 3, Line 10;Pro. 4, Lines 13, 29; Pro. 5,
Line 17: The set dests is constructed immediately before
the invalidation procedure. For (rip, rsn) ∈ ξip
N
(dests), we
have sqnip
N
(rip) ≤ inc(sqnip
N
(rip)) = rsn.
Pro. 6, Line 3: When constructing dests in Line 2, the side
condition ξip
N2
(sqn(rt ,rip)) < ξip
N2
(rsn) is taken into ac-
count, which immediately yields the claim for (rip, rsn) ∈
ξ
ip
N
(dests). ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 6 According to Section 5.7 the claim
holds for each initial state, and none of our processes has an
assignment changing the value of the variable ip. ⊓⊔
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Proof of Proposition 8 All initial states trivially satisfy the
invariant since all routing tables are empty. The functions
invalidate and addpreRT do not affect the invariant, since
they do not change the hop count of a routing table en-
try. Therefore, we only have to look at the application calls
of update. In each case, if the update does not change the
routing table entry beyond its precursors (the last clause of
update), the invariant is trivially preserved; hence we examine
the cases that an update actually occurs.
Pro. 1, Lines 10, 14, 18: All these updates have a hop count
equal to 1; hence the invariant is preserved.
Pro. 4, Line 4; Pro. 5, Line 2: Here, ξ(hops) + 1 is used for
the update. Since ξ(hops) ∈ IN, the invariant is main-
tained. ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 9
(a) We have to check that the consequent holds whenever a
route request is sent. In all the processes there are only
two locations where this happens.
Pro. 1, Line 39: A request with content ξ(0,∗,∗,∗,∗,ip,∗,ip)
is sent. Since the sixth and the eighth component are
the same (ξ(ip)), the claim holds.
Pro. 4, Line 36: The message has the form rreq(ξ(hops)
+1,∗,∗,∗,∗,∗,∗,∗) Since ξ(hops) ∈ IN, ξ(hops)+1 6= 0
and hence the antecedent does not hold.
(b) We have to check that the consequent holds whenever
a route reply is sent. In all the processes there are only
three locations where this happens.
Pro. 4, Line 10: A reply with content ξ(0,dip,∗,∗,ip) is
sent. By Line 7 we have ξ(dip) = ξ(ip), so the claim
holds.
Pro. 4, Line 25: rrep(dhops(rt ,dip),∗,∗,∗,∗) is the form
of the message. By Proposition 8, dhops(rt,dip) > 0,
so the antecedent does not hold.
Pro. 5, Line 13: rrep(ξ(hops)+1 , ∗ ,∗ , ∗ , ∗) is the form
of the message. Since ξ(hops) ∈ IN, ξ(hops) + 1 6= 0
and hence the antecedent does not hold. ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 10 At the initial states all routing ta-
bles are empty. Since invalidate and addpreRT change nei-
ther the sequence-number-status flag, nor the next hop or the
hop count of a routing table entry, and—by Proposition 5—
cannot decrease the sequence number of a destination, we
only have to look at the application calls of update. As before,
we only examine the cases that an update actually occurs.
(a) Function calls of the form update(rt ,r) always preserve
the invariant: in case update is given an argument for
which it is not defined,28 the process algebra blocks and
no change of the routing table is performed [16, Sec-
tion 4]; in case one of the first four clauses in the definition
of update is used, this follows because update(rt,r) is de-
fined only when π2(r)=0⇔ π3(r)=unk; in case the fifth
clause is used it follows because π3(r) = unk; and in case
the last clause is used, it follows by induction, since the
invariant was already valid before the update.
(b) Pro. 1, Lines 10, 14, 18: All these updates have an un-
known sequence number and hop count equal to 1.
By Clause 5 of update, these sequence-number-status
flag and hop count are transferred literally into the
routing table; hence the invariant is preserved.
Pro. 4, Line 4 and Pro. 5, Line 2: In these updates the
sequence-number-status flag is set to kno. By the def-
inition of update, this value ends up in the routing
table. Hence the assumption of the invariant to be
proven is not satisfied.
28 In Section 6.4 we will show that this cannot occur.
(c) Pro. 1, Lines 10, 14, 18: The new entries, which have
the form ξ(sip, 0, unk, val, 1, sip, ∅), satisfy the in-
variant; even if the routing table is actually updated
with one of the new routes, the invariant holds after-
wards.
Pro. 4, Line 4; Pro. 5, Line 2: The route that might be
inserted into the routing table has hop count hops+1,
hops ∈ IN. It can only be equal to 1 if the received
message had hop count hops = 0. In that case In-
variant (5), resp. (6), guarantees that the invariant
remains unchanged.
(d) Immediate from Parts (a) to (c). ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 11
(a) We have to check that the consequent holds whenever a
route request is sent.
Pro. 1, Line 39: A route request is initiated. The origi-
nator sequence number is a copy of the node’s own se-
quence number, i.e., osnc = ξ(sn). By Proposition 2,
we get osnc ≥ 1.
Pro. 4, Line 36: osnc := ξ(osn) is not changed within
Pro. 4; it stems, through Line 8 of Pro. 1, from an
incoming RREQ message (Pro. 1, Line 1). For this
incoming RREQ message, using Proposition 1(a) and
induction on reachability, the invariant holds; hence
the claim follows immediately.
(b) We have to check that the consequent holds whenever a
route reply is sent.
Pro. 4, Line 10: The destination initiates a route reply.
The sequence number is a copy of the node’s own se-
quence number, i.e., dsnc = ξ(sn). By Proposition 2,
we get dsnc ≥ 1.
Pro. 4, Line 25: The sequence number used for the mes-
sage is copied from the routing table; its value is
dsnc := sqn(ξ(rt),ξ(dip)). By Line 20, we know that
flag(ξ(rt),ξ(dip)) = kno and hence, by Invariant (7),
dsnc ≥ 1. Thus the invariant is maintained.
Pro. 5, Line 13: dsnc := ξ(dsn) is not changed within
Pro. 5; it stems, through Line 12 of Pro. 1, from an
incoming RREP message (Pro. 1, Line 1). For this in-
coming RREP message the invariant holds and hence
the claim follows immediately. ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 12
(a) We have to check all cases where a route request is sent:
Pro. 1, Line 39: A new route request is initiated with
ipc = oipc := ξ(ip) = ip. Here the antecedent of (13)
is not satisfied.
Pro. 4, Line 36: The broadcast message has the form
ξ(rreq(hops+1 ,rreqid ,dip ,max(sqn(rt ,dip), dsn) ,
dsk,oip,osn,ip)). Hence hopsc := ξ(hops)+1, oipc :=
ξ(oip), osnc := ξ(osn), ipc := ξ(ip) = ip and ξ
ipc
N
= ξ
(by (3)). At Line 4 we update the routing table using
r := ξ(oip, osn, kno, val, hops+1, sip, ∅) as new entry.
The routing table does not change between Lines 4
and 36; nor do the values of the variables hops, oip
and osn. If the new (valid) entry is inserted into the
routing table, then one of the first four cases in the
definition of update must have applied—the fifth case
cannot apply, since π3(r) = kno. Thus, using that
oipc 6= ipc,
sqn
ipc
N
(oipc) = sqn(ξ(rt) , ξ(oip)) = ξ(osn) = osnc
dhops
ipc
N
(oipc) = dhops(ξ(rt) , ξ(oip)) = ξ(hops)+1
= hopsc
flag
ipc
N
(oipc) = flag(ξ(rt) , ξ(oip)) = ξ(val) = val .
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In case the new entry is not inserted into the routing
table (the sixth case of update), we have sqnipc
N
(oipc)
= sqn(ξ(rt) , ξ(oip)) ≥ ξ(osn) = osnc, and in case
that sqnipc
N
(oipc) = osnc we see that dhops
ipc
N
(oipc) =
dhops(ξ(rt),ξ(oip)) ≤ ξ(hops)+ 1 = hopsc and more-
over flagipc
N
(oipc) = val. Hence the invariant holds.
(b) We have to check all cases where a route reply is sent.
Pro. 4, Line 10: A new route reply with ipc := ξ(ip) =
ip is initiated. Moreover, by Line 7, dipc := ξ(dip) =
ξ(ip) = ip and thus ipc = dipc. Hence, the antecedent
of (14) is not satisfied.
Pro. 4, Line 25: We have ipc := ξ(ip) = ip, so ξ
ipc
N
= ξ.
This time, by Line 18, dipc := ξ(dip) 6= ξ(ip) = ipc.
By Line 20 there is a valid routing table entry for
dipc := ξ(dip).
dsnc := sqn(ξ(rt) , ξ(dip)) = sqn
ipc
N
(dipc) ,
hopsc := dhops(ξ(rt) , ξ(dip)) = dhops
ipc
N
(dipc) .
Pro. 5, Line 13: The RREP message has the form
ξ(rrep(hops+1 ,dip ,dsn ,oip ,ip)) .
Hence hopsc := ξ(hops)+1, dipc := ξ(dip), dsnc :=
ξ(dsn), ipc := ξ(ip) = ip and ξ
ipc
N
= ξ. Using (ξ(dip),
ξ(dsn), kno, val, ξ(hops)+1, ξ(sip), ∅) as new entry,
the routing table is updated at Line 2. With excep-
tion of its precursors, which are irrelevant here, the
routing table does not change between Lines 2 and 13;
nor do the values of the variables hops, dip and dsn.
Line 1 guarantees that during the update in Line 2,
the new entry is inserted into the routing table, so
sqn
ipc
N
(dipc) = sqn(ξ(rt) , ξ(dip)) = ξ(dsn) = dsnc
dhops
ipc
N
(dipc) = dhops(ξ(rt) , ξ(dip)) = ξ(hops)+ 1
= hopsc
flag
ipc
N
(dipc) = flag(ξ(rt) , ξ(dip)) = ξ(val)
= val . ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 13 We have to check that the conse-
quent holds whenever a route error message is sent. In all the
processes there are only seven locations where this happens.
Pro. 1, Line 32: The set destsc is constructed in Line 31 as
a subset of ξip
N31
(dests) = ξip
N28
(dests). For each pair
(ripc, rsnc) ∈ ξ
ip
N28
(dests) one has ripc = ξ
ip
N27
(rip) ∈
vD
ip
N27
. Then in Line 28, using the function invalidate,
flag(ξ(rt),ripc) is set to inv and sqn(ξ(rt),ripc) to rsnc.
Thus we obtain ripc ∈ iD
ip
N
and sqnip
N
(ripc) = rsnc.
Pro. 3, Line 14; Pro. 4, Lines 17, 33; Pro. 5, Line 21; Pro. 6,
Line 8: Exactly as above.
Pro. 3, Line 20: The set destsc contains only one single ele-
ment. Hence ripc :=ξ
ip
N
(dip) and rsnc :=ξ
ip
N
(sqn(rt,dip)).
By Line 18, we have ripc = ξ
ip
N
(dip) ∈ iDip
N
. The re-
maining claim follows by rsnc = ξ
ip
N
(sqn(rt , dip)) =
sqn(ξip
N
(rt) , ξip
N
(dip)) = sqnip
N
(ripc). ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 14
(a) In all initial states the invariant is satisfied, as a routing
table starts out empty (see (2) in Section 5.7). None of
the Processes 1–7 of Section 5 changes a routing table
directly; the only way a routing table can be changed is
through the functions update, invalidate and addpreRT.
The latter two only change the sequence number, the
validity status and the precursors of an existing route.
This kind of update has no effect on the invariant. The
first function inserts a new entry into a routing table only
if the destination is unknown, that is, if no entry for this
destination already exists in the routing table; otherwise
the existing entry is replaced. Therefore the invariant is
maintained.
(b) In any initial state the invariant is satisfied, as each store
of queued data packets starts out empty. In Processes 1–7
of Section 5 a store is updated only through the functions
add and drop. These functions respect the invariant.
(c) This is checked by inspecting all assignments to dests in
Processes 1–7.
Pro. 1, Line 16: The message ξ(msg) is received in Line 1,
and hence, by Proposition 1(a), sent by some node be-
fore. The content of the message does not change dur-
ing transmission, and we assume there is only one way
to read a message ξ(msg) as rerr(ξ(dests) , ξ(sip)).
By induction, we may assume that when the other
node composed the message, a partial function was
assigned to the first argument ξ(dests) of rerr.
Pro. 1, Line 27; Pro. 3, Line 9; Pro. 4, Lines 12, 28;
Pro. 5, Line 16: The assigned sets have the form
{(ξ(rip), inc(sqn(ξ(rt) , ξ(rip)))) | . . . }). Since inc
and sqn are functions, for each ξ(rip) there is only
one pair (ξ(rip), inc(sqn(ξ(rt) , ξ(rip)))).
Pro. 1, Line 31; Pro. 3, Line 13; Pro. 4, Lines 16, 32;
Pro. 5, Line 20; Pro. 6, Line 7: In each of these
cases a set ξ(dests) constructed four lines before is
used to construct a new set. By the invariant to be
proven, these sets are already partial functions. From
these sets some values are removed. Since subsets of
partial functions are again partial functions, the claim
follows immediately.
Pro. 6, Line 2: Similar to the previous case except that
the set ξ(dests) to be thinned out is not constructed
before but stems from an incoming RERR message.
Pro. 3, Lines 20: The set is explicitly given and consists
of only one element; thus the claim is trivial. ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 15 update(rt , r) is defined only under
the assumptions π4(r) = val, π2(r) = 0⇔ π3(r) = unk and
π3(r) = unk ⇒ π5(r) = 1. In Pro. 1, Lines 10, 14 and 18,
the entry ξ(sip, 0, unk, val, 1, sip, ∅) is used as second argu-
ment, which obviously satisfies the assumptions. The function
is used at four other locations:
Pro. 4, Line 4: Here, the entry ξ(oip, osn, kno, val, hops +
1, sip, ∅) is used as r to update the routing table. This
entry fulfils π4(r) = val. Since π3(r) = kno, it remains
to show that π2(r) = ξ(osn) ≥ 1. The sequence number
ξ(osn) stems, through Line 8 of Pro. 1, from an incoming
RREQ message and is not changed within Pro. 4. Hence,
by Invariant (11), ξ(osn) ≥ 1.
Pro. 5, Lines 1, 2, 26: The update is similar to the one of
Pro. 4, Line 4. The only difference is that the information
stems from an incoming RREP message and that a rout-
ing table entry to ξ(dip) (instead of ξ(oip)) is established.
Therefore, the proof is similar to the one of Pro. 4, Line 4;
instead of Invariant (11) we use Invariant (12). ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 16 The function nhop(rt ,dip) is defined
iff dip ∈ kD(rt).
Pro. 1, Line 27; Pro. 3, Line 9; Pro. 4, Lines 12, 28; Pro. 5,
Line 16; Pro. 6, Line 2: The function is used within a
formula.
Pro. 1, Line 23: Line 21 states ξ(dip) ∈ vD(ξ(rt)); hence
nhop(ξ(rt) , ξ(dip)) is defined.
Pro. 3, Line 7: By Line 5, ξ(dip) ∈ vD(ξ(rt)).
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Pro. 4, Lines 10, 25: In Line 4 the entry for destination
ξ(oip) is updated; by this ξ(oip) ∈ kD(ξ(rt)).
Pro. 4, Line 23: By Line 20 ξ(dip) ∈ vD(ξ(rt)).
Pro. 5, Lines 11, 13: By Line 9 ξ(oip) ∈ vD(ξ(rt)).
Pro. 5, Line 12: In Line 2 the entry for destination ξ(dip) is
updated; by this ξ(dip) ∈ kD(ξ(rt)). By Line 9 ξ(oip) ∈
vD(ξ(rt)).
If nhop is used within a formula, then nhop(rt,rip) may not be
defined, namely if rip 6∈ kD(rt). In such a case, according to
the convention of Footnote 8 in Section 3, the atomic formula
in which this term occurs evaluates to false, and thereby is
defined properly. ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 17 For the proof we denote the routing
table after the update by rt′.
(a) By assumption, there is an entry (dip, dsnrt, ∗, frt, hopsrt,
∗, ∗) for dip in rt. In case π1(r) 6= dip the quality of the
routing table w.r.t. dip stays the same, since the entry
for dip is not changed.
We first assume that r := (dip, 0, unk, val, 1, ∗, ∗). This
means that the Clause 5 in the definition of update is
used. The updated routing table entry to dip has the
form (dip, dsnrt, unk, val, 1, ∗, ∗). So
nsqn(rt ,dip) ≤ sqn(rt ,dip) = dsnrt = nsqn(rt′ ,dip) ,
and dhops(rt ,dip) = hopsrt ≥ 1 = dhops(rt′ ,dip) .
The first inequality holds by (16); the penultimate step
by Invariant (4).
Next, we assume that the sequence number is known
and therefore the route used for the update has the form
r = (dip, dsn, kno, val, hops, ∗, ∗) with dsn ≥ 1. After the
performed update the routing entry for dip either has the
form (dip, dsnrt, ∗, frt, hopsrt, ∗, ∗) or (dip, dsn, kno, val,
hops, ∗, ∗). In the former case the invariant is trivially
preserved; in the latter, we know, by definition of update,
that either (i) dsnrt < dsn, (ii) dsnrt = dsn ∧ hopsrt >
hops, or (iii) dsnrt = dsn ∧ frt = inv holds. We complete
the proof of the invariant by a case distinction.
(i) holds: First, nsqn(rt , dip) ≤ dsnrt < dsn = sqn(rt′ ,
dip) = nsqn(rt′ , dip). Since dsnrt is strictly smaller
than nsqn(rt′ ,dip), there is nothing more to prove.
(iii) holds: We have nsqn(rt , dip) = dsnrt
•− 1 < dsn =
sqn(rt′ , dip) = nsqn(rt′ , dip). The inequality holds
since either dsnrt
•− 1 = 0 < 1 ≤ dsn or dsnrt
•− 1 =
dsnrt − 1 < dsnrt = dsn.
(ii) holds but (iii) does not: Then frt = val. In this case
the update does not change the net sequence number
for dip: nsqn(rt ,dip) = dsnrt = dsn = nsqn(rt′ ,dip).
By (ii), the hop count decreases:
dhops(rt ,dip) = hopsrt > hops = dhops(rt′ ,dip) .
(b) Assume that invalidate modifies an entry of the form
(rip, dsn, ∗,flag, ∗, ∗, ∗). Let (rip, rsn)∈ dests; then flag=
val and the update results in the entry (rip, inc(dsn), ∗,
inv, ∗, ∗, ∗). By definition of net sequence numbers,
nsqn(rt ,rip) = sqn(rt ,rip) = dsn = inc(dsn) •− 1
= nsqn(rt′ ,rip) .
Since the hop count is not changed by invalidate, we
also have dhops(rt,rip) = dhops(rt′,rip), and hence rt ≈dip
invalidate(rt ,dests).
(c) The function addpreRT only modifies a set of precursors;
it does not change the sequence number, the validity, the
flag, nor the hop count of any entry of the routing table
rt. ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 19 As before, we first check the initial
states of our transition system and then check all locations
in Processes 1–7 where a routing table might be changed.
For an initial network expression, the invariant holds since
all routing tables are empty.
A modification of ξnhip
N
(rt) is harmless, as it can only
increase kDnhip
N
(cf. Proposition 4) as well as nsqnnhip
N
(dip) (cf.
Theorem 18).
Adding precursors to ξip
N
(rt) does not harm since the in-
variant does not depend on precursors. It remains to examine
all calls of update and invalidate to ξip
N
(rt). Without loss
of generality we restrict attention to those applications of
update or invalidate that actually modify the entry for dip,
beyond its precursors; if update only adds some precursors
in the routing table, the invariant—which is assumed to hold
before—is maintained. If invalidate occurs, the next hop
nhip is not changed. Since the invariant has to hold before
the execution, it follows that dip ∈ kDnhip
N
also holds after
execution.
Pro. 1, Lines 10, 14, 18: The entry ξ(sip,0,unk,val,1,sip,∅) is
used for the update; its destination is dip := ξ(sip). Since
dip = ξ(sip) = nhopip
N
(ξ(sip)) = nhopip
N
(dip) = nhip, the
antecedent of the invariant to be proven is not satisfied.
Pro. 1, Line 28; Pro. 3, Line 10; Pro. 4, Lines 13, 29; Pro. 5,
Line 17: In each of these cases, the precondition of (18) is
satisfied by the executions of the line immediately before
the call of invalidate (Pro. 1, Line 27, Pro. 3, Line 9;
Pro. 4, Lines 12, 28; Pro. 5, Line 16). Thus, the quality of
the routing table w.r.t. dip, and thereby the net sequence
number of the routing table entry for dip, remains un-
changed. Therefore the invariant is maintained.
Pro. 4, Line 4: Let us assume that the routing table entry
ξ(oip, osn, kno, val, hops+1, sip, ∗) is inserted into ξ(rt).
So dip := ξ(oip), nhip := ξ(sip), nsqnip
N
(dip) := ξ(osn)
and dhopsip
N
(dip) := ξ(hops) + 1. This information is dis-
tilled from a received route request message (cf. Lines 1
and 8 of Pro. 1). By Proposition 1 this message was sent
before, say in state N†; by Proposition 7 the sender of
this message is ξ(sip).
By Invariant (13), with ipc := ξ(sip) = nhip, oipc :=
ξ(oip) = dip, osnc := ξ(osn) and hopsc := ξ(hops),
and using that ipc = nhip 6= dip = oipc, we get that
dip ∈ kDnhip
N†
and
sqn
nhip
N†
(dip) = sqnipc
N†
(oipc) > osnc = ξ(osn) , or
sqn
nhip
N†
(dip) = ξ(osn) ∧ flagnhip
N†
(dip) = val .
We first assume that the first line holds. Then, by Theo-
rem 18 and (16),
nsqn
nhip
N
(dip) ≥ nsqnnhip
N†
(dip) ≥ sqnnhip
N†
(dip) •− 1
≥ ξ(osn) = nsqnip
N
(dip) .
We now assume the second line to be valid. From this we
conclude
nsqn
nhip
N
(dip) ≥ nsqnnhip
N†
(dip) = sqnnhip
N†
(dip)
= ξ(osn) = nsqnip
N
(dip) .
Pro. 5, Line 2: The update is similar to the one of Pro. 4,
Line 4. The only difference is that the information stems
from an incoming RREP message and that a routing table
entry to ξ(dip) (instead of ξ(oip)) is established. There-
fore, the proof is similar to the one of Pro. 4, Line 4;
instead of Invariant (13) we use Invariant (14).
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Pro. 6, Line 3: Let N3 and N be the network expressions
right before and right after executing Pro. 6, Line 3. The
entry for destination dip can be affected only if (dip, dsn)
∈ ξip
N2
(dests) for some dsn ∈ SQN. In that case, by Line 2,
(dip, dsn) ∈ ξip
N2
(dests), dip ∈ vDip
N2
, and nhopip
N2
(dip) =
ξ
ip
N2
(sip). By definition of invalidate, sqnip
N
(dip) = dsn
and flagip
N
(dip) = inv, so
nsqn
ip
N
(dip) = sqnip
N
(dip) •− 1 = dsn •− 1 .
Hence we need to show that dsn •− 1 ≤ nsqnnhip
N
(dip).
The values ξip
N2
(dests) and ξip
N2
(sip) stem from a received
route error message (cf. Lines 1 and 16 of Pro. 1). By
Proposition 1(a), a transition labelled
R:*cast(rerr(destsc , ipc))
with destsc := ξ
ip
N2
(dests) and ipc := ξ
ip
N2
(sip) must have
occurred before, say in state N†. By Proposition 7, the
node casting this message is ipc= ξ
ip
N2
(sip)= nhopip
N2
(dip)
= nhopip
N
(dip) = nhip. The penultimate equation holds
since the next hop to dip is not changed during the exe-
cution of Pro. 6. By Proposition 13 we have dip ∈ iDnhip
N†
and dsn ≤ sqn(ξnhip
N†
(rt) ,dip). Hence
nsqn
nhip
N
(dip) ≥ nsqnnhip
N†
(dip) = nsqn(ξnhip
N†
(rt) ,dip)
= sqn(ξnhip
N†
(rt) ,dip) •− 1 ≥ dsn •− 1 ,
where the first inequality follows by Theorem 18. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 23 In the course of running the protocol,
the set of edges E in the connectivity graph CH only in-
creases, so the properties are invariants. We prove them by
simultaneous induction.
(a) In an initial state the invariant is satisfied because the
routing tables are empty. Since entries can never be re-
moved, and the functions addpreRT and invalidate do
not affect hops and nhip, it suffices to check all applica-
tion calls of update. In each case, if the update does not
change the routing table entry beyond its precursors (the
last clause of update), the invariant is trivially preserved;
hence we examine the cases that an update actually oc-
curs.
Pro. 1, Lines 10, 14, 18: The update changes the entry
into ξ(sip, ∗, unk, val, 1, sip, ∗); hence hops= 1 and
nhip = dip := ξ(sip). The value ξ(sip) stems through
Lines 8, 12 or 16 of Pro. 1 from an incoming AODV
control message. By Proposition 1 this message was
sent before, say in state N†; by Proposition 7 the
sender of this message is ξ(sip) = nhip. Since in
state N† the message must have reached the queue
of incoming messages of node ip, it must be that
ip ∈Rnhip
N†
. In our formalisation of AWN the connec-
tivity graph is always symmetric [16]: nhip ∈ Rip
N†
iff
ip ∈Rnhip
N†
. It follows that (ip,nhip) ∈ E, so there is a
1-hop path in CH from ip to dip.
Pro. 4, Line 4: Here dip := ξ(oip), hops := ξ(hops)+1
and nhip := ξ(sip). These values stem from an in-
coming RREQ message, which must have been sent
beforehand, say in state N†. As in the previous case
we obtain (ip,nhip) ∈ E. By Invariant (22), with
oipc := ξ(oip) = dip, hopsc := ξ(hops) and ipc :=
ξ(sip) = nhip, there is a path nhip → · · · → dip in
CH from ipc to oipc with hopsc hops. It follows that
there is a path ip→ nhip→ · · · → dip in CH from ip
to dip with hops hops and next hop nhip.
Pro. 5, Line 2: Here dip := ξ(dip), hops := ξ(hops)+1
and nhip := ξ(sip). The reasoning is exactly as in the
previous case, except that we deal with an incoming
RREP message and use Invariant (23).
(b) We check all occasions where a route request is sent.
Pro. 1, Line 39: A new route request is initiated with
ipc = oipc := ξ(ip) = ip and hopsc := 0. Indeed
there is a path in CH from ipc to oipc with 0 hops.
Pro. 4, Line 36: The broadcast message has the form
ξ(rreq(hops+1 ,rreqid ,dip ,max(sqn(rt ,dip), dsn),
dsk ,oip ,osn ,ip)) .
So hopsc:=ξ(hops)+1, oipc:=ξ(oip) and ipc:=ξ(ip)
= ip. The values ξ(hops) and ξ(oip) stem through
Line 8 of Pro. 1 from an incoming RREQ message of
the form
ξ(rreq(hops ,rreqid ,dip ,dsn ,dsk ,oip ,osn ,sip)) .
By Proposition 1 this message was sent before, say in
state N†; by Proposition 7 the sender of this message
is sip := ξ(sip). By induction, using Invariant (22),
there is a path sip → · · · → oipc in CH† ⊆ CH from
sip to oipc with ξ(hops) hops. It remains to show
that there is a 1-hop path from ip to sip. In state
N† the message sent by sip must have reached the
queue of incoming messages of node ip, and therefore
ip was in transmission range of sip, i.e., ip ∈Rsip
N†
.
Since the connectivity graph of AWN is always sym-
metric, ip ∈Rsip
N†
holds as well. Hence it follows that
(ip, sip) ∈ E.
(c) We check all occasions where a route reply is sent.
Pro. 4, Line 10: A new route reply with hopsc := 0 and
ipc := ξ(ip) = ip is initiated. Moreover, by Line 7,
dipc := ξ(dip) = ξ(ip) = ip. Thus there is a path in
CH from ipc to dipc with 0 hops.
Pro. 4, Line 25: We have ipc :=ξ(ip)= ip, dipc :=ξ(dip)
and hopsc := dhops
ip
N
(dipc). By Line 20 there is a
routing table entry (dipc, ∗, ∗, ∗, hopsc, ∗, ∗)∈ ξ
ip
N
(rt).
Hence by Invariant (a), which we may assume to hold
when using simultaneous induction, there is a path
ip → · · · → dipc in CH from ip = ipc to dipc with
hopsc hops.
Pro. 5, Line 13: The RREP message has the form
ξ(rrep(hops+1 , dip , dsn , oip , ip)) and the proof
goes exactly as for Pro. 4, Line 36 of Part (b), by
using dipc := ξ(dip) instead of oipc := ξ(oip), and
an incoming RREP message instead of an incoming
RREQ message. ⊓⊔
